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ABSTRACT—It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative
drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such
mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to
recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than
correcting a technical mistake.
This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current
rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both
by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the
current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false
positives) but not the other (false negatives), it systematically
underrecognizes errors and results in systematic misinterpretation of the
law.
Using the example of King v. Burwell, this Article shows that the
overly strict scrivener’s error doctrine threatens dramatic real-world harm.
In King, opponents of the Affordable Care Act exploited a likely, but less
than absolutely clear, scrivener’s error to nearly bring down the most
significant health reform legislation of the past half century. More still, the
challenge only failed because six Justices were willing to accept an
implausible textual argument. Furthermore, King is far from sui generis.
Recent challenges to ambitious executive branch action, for example, try to
take similar advantage of the current doctrine.
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It is, of course, an indispensable part of a scrivener’s business to verify
the accuracy of his copy, word by word. Where there are two or more
scriveners in an office, they assist each other in this examination, one
reading from the copy, the other holding the original. It is a very dull,
wearisome, and lethargic affair.†
INTRODUCTION
Speakers occasionally misspeak. Congress is no exception. Like the
rest of us, Congress sometimes says “and” when it means to say “or,”1 or
“less” when it means to say “more.”2 Courts take this into account, but only
in “rare” cases.3 Pursuant to the “scrivener’s error” doctrine, courts
recognize a “meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed” if
and only if Congress’s inadequately expressed intention is “absolutely
clear.”4 If, by contrast, misexpression is merely “likely,”5 courts disregard
Congress’s likely intention, instead enforcing a statute “as written.”6 Thus,

† HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET 31 (Simon &
Schuster 1997) (1853).
1 See United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2004).
2 See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140,
1145–46 (9th Cir. 2006).
3 Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (“We do not believe that this is one of those
rare cases where the application of the statute as written will produce a result ‘demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of its drafters.’” (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982))); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
4 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 455 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“It may be unlikely that this is what Congress actually had in mind; but it is what
Congress said, it is not so absurd as to be an obvious mistake, and it is therefore the law.”).
6 Demarest, 498 U.S. at 190.
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if Congress says “and” but only likely means to say “or,” it falls on
Congress to correct its likely mistake.7 Until it does, “and” means and.
Scrivener’s errors are largely unaddressed by existing scholarship—
the most influential discussion of the topic to date is contained in a single
footnote.8 What scholarship there is is basically supportive of the current
doctrine. John Manning, for example, suggests that courts may be right to
recognize scrivener’s errors so long as those errors are “obvious.”9 Others
insist that error recognition is appropriate, but only in “extreme
circumstances,”10 or if evidence of error is “near conclusive.”11
This Article argues that, even on its own terms, the current scrivener’s
error doctrine is erroneous. It produces systematic misinterpretation in the
form of systematic underrecognition of errors. Courts insist time and again
that the measure of statutory interpretation is Congress’s intent,
appropriately conceived.12 Yet by this measure, the current doctrine reliably
delivers the wrong results. To explain, the rationale for recognizing only
“absolutely clear” scrivener’s errors is that, if a court were to recognize a
less clear error, it “might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a
technical mistake.”13 But as this Article shows, the reverse is often true. If a
scrivener’s error is more likely than not, but less than “absolutely clear,” a
court is—by its own lights—probably “rewriting the statute” by refusing to
recognize the likely error. After all, a court in such a case finds itself in the
embarrassing position of having to say (or at least think), “Congress
probably meant one thing, but we are going to act as if it meant something
7 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law something
different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent.”).
8 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2459 n.265 (2003)
[hereinafter Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine].
9 Id. (arguing that error recognition may be permissible “when an internal textual inconsistency or
an obvious error of grammar, punctuation, or English usage is apparent from reading a word or phrase
in the context of the text as a whole,” such that “there is only the remotest possibility that any such
clerical mistake reflected a deliberate legislative compromise”); see also Andrew S. Gold, Absurd
Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 28 (2006) (arguing that
textualism allows for recognition of scrivener’s errors only if “obvious”).
10 Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener’s Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 589, 613–14 (2000).
11 John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and the Problem of Scrivener’s Error, 64 ME. L. REV. 119,
155 (2011) (arguing that recognition of a scrivener’s error is permissible “only in the very rare case
where there is near-conclusive evidence” of error).
12 See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398–99 (2011) (Thomas, J.) (“This
understanding of the text is compelled by ‘the broader context of the statute as a whole,’ which
demonstrates Congress’[s] intent to channel prisoners’ claims first to the state courts.” (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))); Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 541 U.S. 369,
377 (2004) (Stevens, J.) (“In order to ascertain Congress’[s] intent, therefore, we must look beyond the
bare text of § 1658 to the context in which it was enacted and the purposes it was designed to
accomplish.”). This leaves open whether the “intent” in which a court should be interested is Congress’s
actual, historical intent or its so-called objectified intent. See infra note 67.
13 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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else.” Put differently, the problem with the rationale for the current doctrine
is that it ignores that courts can misinterpret both by recognizing an error
and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is
designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but not the
other (false negatives), the doctrine consistently underrecognizes
scrivener’s errors.
The current scrivener’s error doctrine, in addition to promoting
inaccuracy, encourages distorted argumentation. Take, as an example, the
recent dispute over insurance subsidies and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)14 in King v. Burwell.15 In that case, the
question before the Court was whether a provision of the tax code
authorizing subsidies for health insurance purchased through “Exchange[s]
established by the State” included insurance purchased through both staterun and federally facilitated exchanges, or through state-run exchanges
alone.16 As this Article explains, it is likely that the provision at issue in
King contains a simple scrivener’s error, namely the accidental omission of
the phrase “or by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services].” Because,
however, that error is less than “absolutely clear,” the current doctrine
prevented the Government and supporting amici from advancing that
argument. Instead, the Government and certain amici opted to argue—far
less plausibly—that the provision at issue was worded precisely, and that
“Exchanges established by the State” just means Exchanges established by
the State or by the Secretary.17 Meanwhile, other amici opted to argue that
the Court should rely on substantive canons of construction to adopt the
more inclusive reading based upon federalism concerns.18 On pains of
misconstruing the statute and, in turn, “destroy[ing]” health insurance
markets throughout the country, the Court accepted the first argument; for
that reason, it did not have to reach the second.19 Regardless, each argument
is dismaying in its own way. The first suggests that words can mean
anything, and the second that courts may rewrite statutes in the service of
lofty constitutional values.
14 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
15 No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015).
16 Id. at 5 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)).
17 See id. at 8; Brief for the Respondents at 20–25, King, No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015),
2015 WL 349885, at *20–25; Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr., John A. Ferejohn, Charles Fried, Lisa
Marshall Manheim, & David A. Strauss as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 15–16, King,
No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015), 2015 WL 428994, at *15–16 [hereinafter Textualism Brief].
18 See Brief for Professors Thomas W. Merrill, Gillian E. Metzger, Abbe R. Gluck, & Nicholas
Bagley as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 6–7, King, No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015),
2015 WL 456257, at *6–7 [hereinafter Federalism Brief].
19 See King, slip op. at 20–21.
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Put more generally, the current scrivener’s error doctrine encourages
litigants and, in turn, courts to treat statutory language as highly malleable.
This conclusion is both surprising and disturbing; after all, the stated
rationale for the current doctrine is to avoid “rewriting” statutes. But as the
majority opinion in King illustrates, the current scrivener’s error doctrine
discourages rather than encourages careful reading of statutory texts. More
still, the problem in King is not sui generis. To the contrary, likely, but less
than absolutely clear, drafting mistakes are pervasive in American law.20
The distorting effect of the current doctrine is thus significant.
The current doctrine is particularly problematic under contemporary
legislative conditions. Today’s statutes are enormous and complex,
containing almost innumerable cross-references and interdependent
provisions. So it is perhaps unsurprising that alterations to one part of a
statute often go unreflected in others, not by design but due to oversight21—
imagine how long it would take Bartleby to read aloud all 906 pages of the
PPACA.22 Under these conditions, the assumption that Congress has chosen
its words with near-perfect precision is especially dubious. To make
matters worse, today’s Congress is beset by unprecedented partisan
gridlock.23 Under these conditions, the familiar consolation that “if
Congress doesn’t like it, it can fix it,”24 offers no consolation at all.25

20 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (omission of
language); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1999) (placement of language); Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (substitution of language); City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund,
511 U.S. 328, 337 & n.3 (1994) (omission of language); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S.
440 (1989) (substitution of language); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (substitution of
language); Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2012) (omission of language); Owner–
Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 615 F.3d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 2010)
(nonupdated cross-reference); Serv. Emps. Int’l, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Program,
595 F.3d 447, 454–55 (2d Cir. 2010) (nonupdated language); United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764
(9th Cir. 2009) (omission of language); United States v. Head, 552 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2009) (omission
of cross-reference); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (omission of
language).
21 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 498 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“The [Act] is a part of an omnibus enactment that occupies 750 pages in
the Statutes at Large. It is not surprising that it contains a scrivener’s error.” (citation omitted)); Am.
Petrol. Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329, 1336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (observing numerous scrivener’s errors
in the Dodd–Frank Act, calling the Act “an enormous and complex statute”).
22 For comparison, whereas the U.S. Constitution contains 4543 words, the PPACA contains
381,517 words. Ali Meyer, Obama’s EPA Regulations: 6,552x as Long as Constitution; 46x as Long as
Bible, CNSNEWS.COM (June 8, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ali-meyer/
obamas-epa-regulations-6552x-long-constitution-46x-long-bible [https://perma.cc/RSU4-JA5W].
23 See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 86 (2015) (“[E]ven
when Congress and the president manage to reach agreement on the big issues of the day, the intense
partisanship and electoral competition of recent years appears to be undermining Congress’s broader
problem-solving capacity.”).
24 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law something
different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform to its intent.”).
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Scrivener’s errors are the proverbial elephant in the mousehole.26
Typographical errors and the like seem the very definition of trivial. As
King shows, however, such legislative snafus threaten dramatic real-world
consequences so long as the scrivener’s error doctrine remains confused.
The current approach persists, perhaps, because scholars have failed to
subject it to serious scrutiny. This Article fills that void. In so doing, it
exposes as reckless a doctrine assumed by almost all to be appropriately
cautious.
This Article has three Parts. Part I offers a conceptual analysis of
scrivener’s errors, distinguishing scrivener’s errors from other types of
legislative mistake. Part II explains the connection between scrivener’s
errors and legislative intent. It shows that both textualists and purposivists
are right to recognize such errors. This Part also clarifies the relationship
between the scrivener’s error doctrine and the so-called absurdity doctrine.
Part III argues that the current scrivener’s error doctrine is misguided, and
that courts should recognize such errors much more freely. This Part also
responds to the objection that a more permissive scrivener’s error doctrine
would invite judicial willfulness or motivated reasoning, as well as the
objection that such a doctrine would encourage sloppier drafting by
Congress.
I.

WHAT IS A SCRIVENER’S ERROR?

A scrivener is (or, better, was) a transcriber of documents.27 In the
literal sense, then, a “scrivener’s error” is a mistake of transcription, which
is to say a mismatch between original (e.g., spoken word, manuscript) and
copy. Today, of course, Congress does not use actual scriveners. Indeed,
the phrase “scrivener’s error” came into popular usage only once reliance
upon scriveners was uncommon.28 The phrase is thus a term of art, referring
to a particular sort of legislative mistake. Specifically, and as explained
more fully throughout Part I, a “scrivener’s error” is a case in which the
words of a legislative text diverge from what Congress meant to say. Such
a case contrasts with one in which Congress simply should have said

25 See Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013) (observing that congressional overriding of statutory
decisions by the Supreme Court has dropped sharply in recent decades).
26 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
27 See MELVILLE, supra note †, at 19 (describing a scrivener as a “law-copyist”).
28 State courts started to use the phrase around the turn of the century. See, e.g., Pond v.
Montgomery, 22 Haw. 241, 242 (1914); McKibbin v. Peters, 40 A. 288, 290 (1898). Federal courts
appear not to have used the phrase before the 1950s. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen,
254 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1958).
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something else. Or, to use Justice Scalia’s gloss, a scrivener’s error is a
“mistake of expression,” as opposed to a lapse of “legislative wisdom.”29
This Part tries to render precise the distinction between meant to say
and should have said. It helps to start with some paradigm cases. Suppose
that you are standing in the security line at the airport and you see a sign
posted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) that reads,
“Please remove your shoe.” In that case, you would likely assume that the
sign contains a typographical error, and that what TSA meant to say was,
“Please remove your shoes.” Suppose now that you have cleared security
and you ask a TSA agent, “Excuse me, where can I find a restroom?” The
agent responds, “Across from gate 46.” Unbeknownst to her, the restroom
across from gate 46 is closed for repairs. As a result, the closest functioning
restroom is the one across from gate 62. In that case, what the TSA agent
meant to say was, “Across from gate 46.” What she should have said, by
contrast, is, “Across from gate 62.”
Or take legislative examples. The Animal Welfare Act operates to,
among other things, “insure that animals . . . are provided humane care and
treatment.”30 Here, Congress plainly meant to say, “ensure.”31 The Act
imposes various conduct requirements for those interacting with nonhuman
animals;32 it does not establish an insurance scheme. Contrast this with the
Defense of Marriage Act, which restricted federal recognition of marriage
to unions between “person[s] of the opposite sex.”33 There, what Congress
meant to say was, without question, “person[s] of the opposite sex.” Yet, as
the Court recognized in United States v. Windsor,34 what Congress should
have said was, “person[s] of the same or opposite sex.” Or, better still,
Congress should have said nothing at all.
A. Difference in Degree
Turn now to the specifics of the distinction. One possibility is that the
difference between meant to say and should have said is one of degree
rather than kind. One might argue that the difference is in the degree of
29 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 20 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
30 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
31 This particular scrivener’s error is especially pervasive. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2)
(2012); 16 U.S.C. § 3171(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(B) (2012).
32 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2144 (requiring government actors to comply with humane standards for
animals in laboratory settings).
33 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
34 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 (2013) (holding this portion of the Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional).

817

DOERFLER (DO NOT DELETE)

6/24/2016 2:43 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

confidence one has that the speaker would regard her statement as a
mistake. Put slightly differently, perhaps the difference is in the degree of
confidence on the part of the listener that the speaker would want the
listener to correct her statement. To render this thought more precise,
maybe to say that a person “meant” to say that p is to say that that person
certainly would have said that p if she had been attentive to pertinent
information. So, for example, to say that Congress “meant” to say that the
Animal Welfare Act operates to “ensure . . . humane care and treatment” is
to say that, if it had been attentive to the respective meanings of “insure”
and “ensure,” that is what Congress certainly would have said. By contrast,
the claim continues, to say that a person “should” have said that p is to say
that that person probably would have said that p if she had been
appropriately attentive. Thus, to say that Congress “should” have said
nothing about what combination of persons constitutes a “marriage” is to
say that, had Congress been attentive to pertinent moral and constitutional
considerations, it probably would have said—or, better, not said—just
that.35
The degree-of-confidence analysis is nonrevisionary in that it helps to
make sense of the current scrivener’s error doctrine. If Congress “meant” to
say that p only if it is certain that Congress would have said that p under
improved epistemic conditions, then it could make sense for courts to
recognize a scrivener’s error just in the case where the error is “absolutely
clear.” If the error is less than “absolutely clear,” after all, it is less than
certain that Congress would appreciate correction. In that case, it may be
that Congress “should” have said something else, i.e., that Congress
probably would have spoken differently under improved epistemic
conditions. But that would be a lapse of “legislative wisdom,” not a
“mistake of expression.”
In other words, perhaps it is not, as suggested above, that courts
recognize only scrivener’s errors that are “absolutely clear.” Maybe it is,
instead, that courts recognize only errors that are “absolutely clear,”
labeling such errors “scrivener’s errors.”
The problem with the degree-of-confidence analysis is that it is
subject to easy counterexample. First, not all clear mistakes are “mistake[s]
of expression.” Suppose, for example, that a jury says that a defendant is
“guilty,” but that exonerating DNA evidence later emerges. In that case, the
jury certainly would have said, “not guilty,” had it been attentive to the
newfound evidence. Nonetheless, the jury plainly meant to say, “guilty.”
Similarly, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established a mandatory
35
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minimum sentence of five years for possession of “5 grams” of crack
cocaine, as contrasted with a five-year minimum for possession of “500
grams” of powder cocaine.36 This 100:1 disparity was predicated upon the
“myth” that crack cocaine is significantly more dangerous than powder
cocaine.37 Recognizing its mistake, Congress, in 2010, increased the
triggering amount of crack cocaine to “28 grams.”38 One can assume
Congress would have said something similar in 1986 had it known then
what it knows now. Still, in 1986, what Congress meant to say was, without
question, “5 grams.”
Second, not all “mistake[s] of expression” are clear mistakes. Say that
the President is scheduled to meet with the Secretary of Labor on Thursday
but often has to reschedule last minute. Earlier in the week, the President
says to the Secretary, “I look forward to our meeting on Friday.” The
Secretary pauses, reasonably uncertain whether the President’s remark
indicates a change in schedule. The President then corrects, “Sorry, I meant
to say, ‘Thursday.’” Likewise, in November 2003, the Department of
Treasury amended the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act,
enlarging the set of “financial institutions” required to report “suspicious
transactions.”39 Curiously and without remark, the definition of
“transaction” established by the Department’s amendments omitted a type
of transaction, purchase, or redemption of casino chips covered by the
previous definition.40 Had the Department just narrowed the reporting
requirement intentionally? Less than clear—at least until January 2004,
when the Department clarified that the omission was “an inadvertent
typographical error,” amending the definition accordingly.41
B. Difference in Kind
The above examples suggest that the difference between meant to say
and should have said is one of kind rather than degree. But what is the
difference? Recall that a scrivener’s error is a linguistic error, as opposed to

36 Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-3 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)).
37 155 CONG. REC. 24,954 (2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
38 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B)(iii)).
39 Definition of Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities as
Financial Institutions, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,392, 65,398 (Nov. 20, 2003) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 103).
40 Compare id., with 31 C.F.R. 103.11 (2002).
41 Definition of Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities as
Financial Institutions, 69 Fed. Reg. 4236, 4236–37 (Jan. 29, 2004) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 103).
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an error in nonlinguistic judgment.42 Building upon this contrast, this
Section argues that the difference between the two types of errors is in the
type of information to which a speaker has failed to attend. On this view, to
say that a person “meant” to say that p is to say that that person would have
said that p if she had been attentive to pertinent linguistic information. For
purposes of this analysis, linguistic information comes in two types. The
first is information about the conventional meaning of words, phrases, or
symbols (e.g., the respective meanings of “insure” and “ensure”). The
second is information about the conversation at issue (e.g., that the speaker
has said “and” rather than “or”). By contrast, to say that a person “should”
have said that p is to say that that person would have said that p if she had
been attentive to pertinent nonlinguistic information (e.g., that federal
recognition only of opposite-sex marriages is both immoral and
unconstitutional), which is to say, any information that is not specifically
linguistic in character.
The type-of-information analysis explains numerous paradigmatic
cases of scrivener’s error. First, the analysis fits what one might call slipof-the-tongue cases—cases in which the author accidentally misuses words
or punctuation. Included here are cases of misspelling,43 misplaced
punctuation,44 or accidental omission or substitution of words.45 In such
cases, one can say that Congress meant to say, “p,” and not, “q,” because
Congress would have said, “p,” had it been alerted to its having said, “q,”
as opposed to, “p.” Prior to 2009, for example, the federal statute governing
removal of class actions required that a petition to appeal an order of a
district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the
state court from which it was removed be “made to the court of appeals not
less than 7 days after entry of the order.”46 Courts regarded this language as

42 Linguistic mistakes are fairly characterized as mistakes of judgment to the extent that linguistic
competency reduces to a capacity for judgment concerning how to use words. See LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 5 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M.
Anscombe et al. trans., rev. 4th ed. 2009) (“A child uses such primitive forms of language when he
learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explaining, but training.”).
43 See Hollender v. Magone, 149 U.S. 586, 590 (1893) (“This retrospect of past legislation, as well
as the character of the other beverages named in combination, indicates the meaning of the word
‘liquors’ as found in this paragraph of the statute of 1883. It is simply a case of misspelling, and
‘liqueurs’ was intended.”).
44 See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 170 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[A] misplaced comma is more plausible than a gross grammatical error . . . .”).
45 See United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 105 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Accordingly, we hold that
the ‘and both’ language contained in the enrolled version of the statute makes no sense as a matter of
grammar, usage, or law; [and] that the ‘or both’ language . . . is what Congress contemplated . . . .”).
46 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4, 12 (emphasis added),
amended by Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16, § 6(2),
123 Stat. 1607, 1608 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012)).
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“illogical and contrary to the stated purpose of the provision,” namely
“creat[ing] a time limit for appeal.”47 Moreover, the accidental substitution
of a word for its opposite is a common linguistic mistake (e.g., “before” for
“after,” “up” for “down,” etc.). From this, courts rightly inferred that what
Congress meant to say was, “not more than.”48 Which is just to say
(correctly) that Congress would have said, “not more than,” had it been
alerted to its having said “not less than,” as opposed to “not more than.”
Second, the analysis fits what Richard Lazarus calls cases of
intentional error—cases in which “the author intended to use the words or
punctuation but was mistaken about their [linguistic] correctness.”49 In such
cases, one can say that Congress meant to say, “p,” and not, “q,” because
Congress would have said, “p,” had it been alerted to the conventional
meanings of “q” and “p,” respectively. The False Claims Act, for example,
refers to the “Government Accounting Office” as opposed to the “General
Accounting Office” (now the “Government Accountability Office”).50
Here, Congress’s word choice was likely intentional, reflecting a common
misunderstanding of the acronym “GAO.”51 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court treated it as uncontroversial that what Congress meant to say was
“General Accounting Office.”52 Which, again, is just to say, correctly, that
Congress would have said, “General Accounting Office,” had it been
alerted to the conventional meanings of “Government Accounting Office”
and “General Accounting Office,” respectively.
Third and most relevant to contemporary legislation, the analysis fits
cases of “incomplete amendment”—cases in which the author intends an
amendment to have global effect but accidentally fails to implement the
amendment someplace. Here the paradigmatic case is one in which a
statutory provision is renumbered, but a cross-reference to that provision
goes unamended.53 In such cases, one can say that Congress meant to say,
“p,” and not, “q,” because Congress would have said, “p,” had it been
alerted to its having said, “p,” in one place and, “q,” in another. In 1962, for
47 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146
(9th Cir. 2006).
48 See id.; Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
49 Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 563
(2014) (discussing the correction of errors in Supreme Court opinions).
50 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & n.1 (2012).
51 See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 398 (3d Cir.
1999) (Becker, C.J., dissenting) (noting that courts have “frequently” made the same mistake).
52 See Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 287 n.6
(2010).
53 Renumbering can also result in a slip-of-the-tongue case if a cross-reference is updated
incorrectly. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1040–44 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing
one such error resulting from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990).
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example, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), adding § 355(j) to require drug manufacturers to establish or
maintain records about the manufacture and testing of drugs.54 Thereafter,
the failure to establish or maintain records under § 355(j) was a prohibited
act under § 331(e) of the Act and subject to criminal penalties. In 1984,
Congress amended FDCA again, enacting an abbreviated drug approval
process for generics under § 355(j) and redesignating the old § 355(j)
concerning recordkeeping as “§ 355(k).”55 Congress failed, however, to
amend § 331(e) to reflect this redesignation. As a result, § 331(e) continued
to instruct that the failure to establish or maintain records under “§ 355(j)”
was subject to criminal penalties, even though the new § 355(j) had nothing
to do with recordkeeping. In United States v. Bhutani, the defendants
argued that the 1984 amendments effectively eliminated criminal penalties
for improper recordkeeping.56 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that
what Congress meant to say in 1984 was that the failure to establish or
maintain records under “§ 355(k)” was subject to criminal penalties.57
Setting aside rule-of-lenity concerns, this seems right. Had Congress been
alerted to its having, on the one hand, redesignated the recordkeeping
provision as “§ 355(k)” and, on the other, its reiterating that improper
recordkeeping under “§ 355(j)” was subject to criminal penalties, what
Congress surely would have said is that criminal penalties were available
for violations of “§ 355(k).” Indeed, that is what Congress did in 1990,
passing a technical amendment to correct its mistake.58
In addition to paradigmatic cases, the analysis also fits antiparadigmatic cases, i.e., common legislative mistakes that are plainly not
scrivener’s errors. Take instances of “practical unwisdom”—when
Congress exercises poor nonlinguistic judgment. In such cases, one can say
that Congress should have said, “p,” and not, “q,” insofar as Congress
would have said, “p,” had it been attentive to certain nonlinguistic
information. One cannot, however, say that Congress meant to say, “p,”
since attention to additional linguistic information would not have
prompted it to say, “p.” Here, examples abound. No amount of attention to
linguistic information would have prompted Congress in 1996 to remain
silent on what constitutes a marriage. Nor in 1986 to set the triggering
54 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 103(a), 76 Stat. 780, 782–83 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).
55 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98
Stat. 1585, 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)).
56 266 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2001).
57 Id. at 667–68 (emphasis added).
58 Vaccine and Immunization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-502, § 5(j), 104 Stat. 1285,
1289 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 331(e)).
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amount for a five-year mandatory minimum sentence at some amount other
than five grams of crack cocaine. In each case, Congress should have said
something other than what it did, i.e., it would have spoken differently had
it known more. Still, in each case, Congress plainly meant what it said.
In addition to case-fit, the type-of-information analysis preserves the
normative significance of the distinction between scrivener’s errors and
other types of legislative mistake. As explained below, the basic argument
for recognizing scrivener’s errors is that doing so is part and parcel of
giving effect to Congress’s specific instructions. For that reason,
recognizing scrivener’s errors is consistent with the separation of powers
principle that policy making is a job for Congress, not courts.59 As observed
at the outset, scrivener’s errors are specifically linguistic mistakes and thus
contrast with other types of legislative mistake, the recognition of which
involves attributing to Congress a failure of policy judgment (e.g., limited
foresight). By excluding from the category of scrivener’s error mistakes
owed to inattention to nonlinguistic—and therefore policy-relevant—
information, the type-of-information analysis thus preserves that contrast,
and, in turn, helps to ensure that courts do not substitute their policymaking
judgment for Congress’s. At least in this respect, the type-of-information
analysis is nonrevisionary compared to degree-of-confidence analysis. The
former, unlike the latter, reflects that there is good reason for courts to treat
policy and linguistic mistakes differently.
II. WHY RECOGNIZE A SCRIVENER’S ERROR?
Having gotten a sense of the distinction between meant to say and
should have said, an immediate question is, why does it matter?
The simple reason is that the distinction corresponds to the basic
separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. It is the role
of the courts to “say what the law is.”60 It is the role of the legislature to say
what the law shall be.61 As explained more fully below, saying what the law
is requires that courts determine what Congress is trying to communicate.
59 See, e.g., Note, Textualism As Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 555 (2009) (arguing that
textualism is grounded in part in a “concern[] that illegitimate expansion of the judicial power will
disrupt the separation of powers and facilitate abusive judicial behavior”); Scalia, supra note 29, at 17–
18 (“The practical threat [of purposivism] is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires,
extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”); Robert F. Nagel,
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 718–23
(1978) (arguing that separation of powers limits judicial lawmaking).
60 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
61 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 545 (1947) (“In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come from those
popularly chosen to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as courts are not.”).
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And because Congress, like the rest of us, sometimes bungles in its efforts
to communicate, this will sometimes involve judging what Congress meant
to say as opposed to what Congress said. By contrast, judging what
Congress should have said pertains not to the content of the law but rather
to Congress’s practical wisdom. “[T]he Constitution,” however, “has not
authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what
Congress . . . do[es].”62
The more complicated reason is that the distinction has greater
apparent significance because of what we now know about legislative
intent.63 It is a platitude that ours is a system of legislative supremacy.64
From this, it is widely inferred that courts must act as faithful agents of
Congress.65 And from this, it is further inferred that courts must give effect
to Congress’s intent, appropriately conceived.66
A. Two Types of Intention
But how to conceive of Congress’s intent?67 One candidate is
Congress’s “practical intention”—its intention to remedy a particular
62 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accord Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 168 (1991) (rejecting a claim on the ground that “it merely challenges the wisdom
of a legitimate policy judgment made by Congress”).
63 For a more comprehensive discussion of legislative intent, see Ryan D. Doerfler, Fictionalism
About Legislative Intent (Apr. 6, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2637723
[https://perma.cc/W87Q-SRSE].
64 See Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 372 (1976)
(“Congressional supremacy is said to be at the heart of the American tradition—which, after all, began
in rebellion against prerogative and government without representation.”).
65 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001)
[hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that
federal judges must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of
the role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature.”).
66 See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2395 & n.23 (“The Court has long
emphasized that, as faithful agents of Congress, federal courts have a constitutional duty to implement
Congress’s ‘intent.’”).
67 The discussion of intent in this Article is agnostic with respect to whether one should care about
Congress’s actual, historical intent, to the extent that it has one, see Doerfler, supra note 63 (arguing
that Congress, as such, forms few if any intentions), or its “objectified intent.” See, e.g., John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) [hereinafter Manning,
Legislative Intent] (emphasis removed); Scalia, supra note 29, at 17. Objectified intent is best
understood as the intent that one would attribute to Congress just on the basis of its having written the
statute at issue in the context of enactment. See Doerfler, supra note 63, at 27. As explained more fully
below, sometimes one would attribute to Congress, just on this basis, an intention to communicate
something that does not correspond perfectly to the words that Congress used. For example, just on the
basis of its using the word “insure” in the context of the Animal Welfare Act, one would attribute to
Congress an intention to communicate ensure. Put more generally, the thought behind objectified intent
is that one should attribute to Congress just those intentions one would attribute just on the basis of its
having said what it said. What obvious scrivener’s error cases show is that sometimes, just on this basis,
one would attribute to Congress an intention to communicate something other than what it said. See
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“mischief.”68 Congress enacts statutes to solve problems, whether real or
perceived.69 In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), for
example, Congress’s practical intention was to help “eliminat[e] . . .
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”70 In giving effect to the
ADA, it would seem that a faithful-agent court must heed this intention.71
Another candidate is Congress’s “communicative intention”—its
intention to communicate a particular proposition or propositions by
enacting statutory language. Section 102(b) of the ADA, for instance,
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a “qualified
individual” on the basis of disability with respect to hiring.72 In uttering this
language, Congress’s communicative intention was to communicate the
proposition that an employer may not discriminate against an individual
qualified for the position for which she applied on the basis of that
individual’s disability.73 Again, in giving effect to section 102(b), it would
seem that this intention binds a faithful-agent court.74
Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 356 (2005) (“[W]hen an appropriately
informed reader would conclude that the statutory text contains a scrivener’s error, textualists can assert
that someone seeking the ‘objective’ meaning of the text would naturally correct the error.”). Contra
Ohlendorf, supra note 11, at 142 (arguing that recognition of scrivener’s errors is inconsistent with
skepticism about actual, historical intent). Similarly, the discussion in this Article is agnostic with
respect to what sources of information courts should consider when discerning Congress’s intent. As I
have explained more fully elsewhere, what information courts consider when making sense of some
legislative text may affect its judgment as to whether that text contains an error. See Doerfler, supra
note 63, at 29–30. As the previous example shows, however, some scrivener’s errors are clear even if
the only information considered is the statutory text itself in combination with minimal background
information (e.g., that the text at issue is statutory text).
68 Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 538–39 (“Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some
mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government.”);
see also Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370,
370 (1947) (observing that some “purpose lies behind all intelligible legislation”).
69 This is common ground between purposivists and textualists. Compare, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61,
64 (1994) (“The goals, purposes, concerns, of the authors illuminate things.”), with Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (“Surely one of
the most frequent justifications courts give for choosing a particular construction is that the alternative
interpretation would produce ‘absurd’ results, or results less compatible with the reason or purpose of
the statute.”).
70 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
71 Cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) (“In deciding the question before us we must be
particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.”).
72 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
73 Larimer v. IBM Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“The term ‘qualified
individual’ in that provision must simply mean qualified to do one’s job, as assumed though nowhere
discussed in the legislative history and the cases.”).
74 Cf. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008) (“[Courts] are not at liberty to
rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable.”); Hanover Bank v. Comm’r, 369 U.S.
672, 682 (1962) (“[Courts] are bound by the meaning of the words used by Congress, taken in
[context].”).
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By focusing on Congress’s communicative intention, this Article thus
rejects the position that the communicative content of a statute consists of
what Congress said regardless of what Congress meant to say. Textualists,
for example, argue that respect for Article I, Section 7’s requirements of
bicameralism and presentment requires that courts attend to duly enacted
statutory text, as opposed to the “unenacted” intentions of legislators.75
From this, one might infer that recognition of garbled communicative
intentions is per se impermissible. That inference, however, would be too
quick. An intention, after all, is only “unenacted” if it is unexpressed by an
enacted text. Thus, to the extent that a text expresses Congress’s
communicative intention, even if imperfectly, that intention is not
“unenacted” in the relevant sense. For this reason, most textualists concede
that, when interpreting some text, a court “must determine what Congress
meant by what it enacted.”76 The intentions that are to be ignored,
according to the textualist, are, therefore, those that are expressed only
somewhere other than the text (e.g., legislative history).77 Thus, with
respect to communicative intention, even textualists are “intentionalists” in
the relevant sense.78
Further, it is well established as a matter of positive law that the object
of inquiry in statutory interpretation is Congress’s communicative
intention, appropriately conceived.79 Courts freely engage in pragmatic
inference when interpreting statutes, attributing to statutes communicative
content that goes beyond what Congress has said.80 Further, and most
relevant here, courts accept uniformly that recognition of scrivener’s errors
is appropriate under certain conditions. If the communicative content of a
statute were just what Congress said, courts would be barred from
recognizing even the most obvious misspellings.81

75 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions. Where the language of
those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”).
76 NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 294 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.)
(emphasis removed); accord Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002)
(Scalia, J.).
77 See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); In re
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Legislative history then may help a
court discover but may not change the original meaning.”).
78 Though, again, textualists are interested in Congress’s “objectified” communicative intention, as
opposed to its actual, historical intention. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
80 See Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423 (2008); Doerfler,
supra note 63, at 2–10.
81 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention
Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 980 (2004) (arguing that
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As a practical matter, courts must consider Congress’s practical and
communicative intentions in tandem. On the one hand, courts agree that
statutory text is the “best evidence” of Congress’s practical intention in a
given case.82 And the linguistic content expressed by some statutory text is
just Congress’s apparent communicative intention.83 On the other hand,
courts must consider Congress’s practical intention to discern its
communicative intention most, if not all, of the time. Courts rightly treat it
as obvious, for example, that “qualified individual” as used in ADA
Section 102(b) is intended to refer to an individual qualified for the
position for which she applied, as opposed to, say, qualified to operate a
motor vehicle or qualified to vote.84 The reason that Congress’s
communicative intention is obvious, however, is that so too is Congress’s
practical concern, namely, hiring discrimination against disabled persons
capable of performing the job.
While courts must consider practical and communicative intentions in
tandem, the two may still appear to conflict. What then? For a long while, a
standard response was that courts should privilege Congress’s practical
intention. As John Manning describes, “[o]n the assumption that Congress
legislates against the constraints of limited time, imperfect foresight, and
imprecise human language,” both scholars and jurists once reasoned that
“when the plain import of a statutory text did not correspond to available
evidence about the law’s purposes, principles of legislative supremacy
required judges to enforce the ‘spirit’ rather than the ‘letter’ of the law.”85
For the Supreme Court, this sort of traditional purposivism reached its
apogee in the now infamous Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.86
In that case, the Court was asked whether a prohibition against contracting
with an alien “to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States”
applied to the hiring of a clergyperson to come to New York to serve as a
minister.87 The Court conceded that the language of the prohibition

recognition of scrivener’s errors commits one to a “baseline of legislative intent, for it is only against
that baseline that it is possible to speak of legislative misspeaking”).
82 See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (“The best evidence of [the
statute’s] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the
President.”).
83 See Nelson, supra note 67, at 354 (observing that both textualists and purposivists “try[] to figure
out ‘what Congress meant by what it said’” when interpreting a statute (quoting In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989)); Doerfler, supra note 63, at 2–10.
84 See supra note 72–74 and accompanying text.
85 John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113 [hereinafter Manning,
The New Purposivism] (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
86 143 U.S. 457.
87 Id. at 458.
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encompassed the hiring of the would-be minister.88 Because, however, the
apparent purpose of the prohibition was to prevent the influx of “cheap
unskilled labor,” the Court held that the hiring of a “brain toiler” such as a
clergyperson was nonetheless permitted.89 “[H]owever broad the language
of the statute may be,” the Court reasoned, “the act, although within the
letter, is not within the [practical] intention of the legislature, and therefore
cannot be within the statute.”90
That was then. Now, the consensus is that if Congress’s practical and
communicative intentions appear to conflict, courts should privilege
Congress’s communicative intention. As Manning observes, both
textualists and “new” purposivists have come to recognize that Congress
legislates means as well as ends.91 In the words of Justice Stevens,
“[s]tatutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises
necessary to their enactment may require adopting means other than those
that would most effectively pursue the main goal.”92 As textualists have
long argued, the best (and perhaps only) way for Congress to identify
specific means is for it to use specific words.93 Thus, if courts treat statutory
text as a “proxy” for a law’s purpose, “they deny legislators the capacity,
through their choice of words, to distinguish those statutes meant to
embody specific . . . choices” with respect to means from those that reflect
no such specification.94 For all of these reasons, a broad majority of the
Court now agrees that if “statutory language is clear, there is no need to
reach . . . arguments based on statutory purpose,” at least in the absence of
absurdity.95 So, for example, if today Congress passed a statute saying, “No
dogs in the park,” courts would not construe that statute as prohibiting
88 Id. (“It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this section, for the
relation of rector to his church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side with compensation on
the other.”).
89 Id. at 464–65. But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1837 (1998) (arguing
that the Court relied upon a misreading of legislative history to reach this conclusion).
90 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472.
91 Here, Manning draws upon Max Radin’s distinction between “ulterior purposes,” i.e., a statute’s
substantive ends, and “implemental purposes,” i.e., the means selected to bring about those ends.
Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 85, at 115 (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,
43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930)).
92 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994); accord Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
601 (2009) (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment) (“[A] statute’s text might reflect a compromise
between parties who wanted to pursue a particular goal to different extents.”).
93 See Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 85, at 116.
94 Id.
95 See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 950 (2009) (Alito, J.); see also Carr v. United States,
560 U.S. 438, 458 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.) (“When the statutory language is plain, the sole function of
the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according
to its terms.” (quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006))).
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lions. No matter if the apparent mischief Congress seeks to remedy is the
presence of dangerous animals.96
Go back now to the distinction between meant to say and should have
said. In Holy Trinity, the Court set aside Congress’s specific instruction
because that instruction was, in the Court’s view, attributable to Congress’s
limited foresight.97 In other words, Congress would have said something
different, the Court reasoned, had it taken into account certain nonlinguistic
information. Specifically, had it thought about alien clergy, Congress
would have carved out a clergy exception to the prohibition of alien labor.98
As a faithful agent, the Court in turn carved out just such an exception on
Congress’s behalf. What we know today is that courts should hesitate to
attribute Congress’s specific instructions to, for example, limited
foresight.99 While it might seem at first glance that Congress should have
said something other than what it did given its practical ends, it is just as
plausible that what Congress said reflects a considered judgment as to
implementation.100
Even still, if the current consensus is that courts must give effect to
Congress’s specific instructions, courts must, as a threshold matter,
determine what specifically Congress instructs. And because Congress
occasionally misspeaks, i.e., commits a scrivener’s error, this will
sometimes involve attributing to Congress specific communicative
intentions that do not fit a “disquotational schema.” In a disquotational
schema, if one says, “p,” one intends to communicate that p.101 When, for
example, Congress says, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is a
fugitive from justice . . . to . . . possess . . . [a] firearm,”102 Congress intends
96 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 535–36, 546 (1983);
Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 85, at 116.
97 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (characterizing this as a case in which “the legislature used general
terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil, and thereafter, unexpectedly, it is developed
that the general language thus employed is broad enough to reach cases and acts which . . . could not
have been intentionally legislated against” (emphasis added)).
98 See id. (“Suppose in the Congress that passed this act some member had offered a bill which in
terms declared that, if any Roman Catholic church in this country should contract with Cardinal
Manning to come to this country and enter into its service as pastor and priest . . . such contract should
be adjudged unlawful and void, and the church making it be subject to prosecution and punishment, can
it be believed that it would have received a minute of approving thought or a single vote?”).
99 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978) (refusing to carve out an
exception to a broadly worded statute, reasoning that “[i]t is not for us to speculate, much less act, on
whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated”).
100 As textualists have long observed, this is all the more apparent given the necessity of legislative
compromise. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 546–47.
101 Cf. W.V. QUINE, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC (2d ed. 1986) (developing a disquotational theory of
truth according to which, for example, the sentence “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is
white).
102 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
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to communicate that it shall be unlawful for any person who is a fugitive
from justice to possess a firearm. Failure to fit a disquotational schema is
most obvious in cases in which Congress misspeaks in a way that renders
the sentence it utters ungrammatical. Thus, if Congress says, “No dogs in
the parl,” courts do best to understand Congress as prohibiting dogs from
the park. To treat the statute as a nullity—as would be the case if courts
read the statute as prohibiting dogs from the parl, whatever that would
mean—would plainly not be to give effect to Congress’s specific
instruction. As indicated above, breakdowns of a disquotational schema,
i.e., scrivener’s errors, are hardly limited to cases of ungrammaticality.
Sometimes Congress says “insure” when it means to communicate ensure.
In those cases, courts give effect to Congress’s specific instruction by
attributing to Congress a misstatement. And that is just to say that, in those
cases, courts do well, qua faithful agents, to say that what Congress meant
to say was “ensure.”
B. The Absurdity Doctrine
A remaining question is how scrivener’s errors relate to the “absurdity
doctrine.”103 Courts sometimes invoke language of “absurdity” when
talking about scrivener’s errors.104 Most notably, Justice Scalia appears to
regard “absurdity” as a necessary condition for scrivener’s error
recognition.105 This association of scrivener’s errors and absurdity might
seem worrisome; the absurdity doctrine is now looked upon with some
skepticism.106 As this Section explains, however, the reasons for skepticism
103

See generally Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Owner–Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 1327
(11th Cir. 2010) (“There is no reason for this Court to rewrite a statute because of an alleged scrivener
error unless a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result.”); Owner–Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n. v. United Van Lines, LLC, 556 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] narrow exception to the
principle of rigid adherence to the plain meaning of a statute is the rare case of a ‘scrivener’s error’ that
produces an ‘absurd result.’”).
105 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the scrivener’s error doctrine as “permit[ting] a court to give an unusual (though not
unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would produce an absurd and
arguably unconstitutional result” (emphasis added)); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since there was here no contention of a ‘scrivener’s error’ producing an
absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have made this litigation unnecessary and
unmaintainable.” (emphasis added)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 238 (2012) (characterizing the recognition of a scrivener’s error
as an application of the absurdity doctrine).
106 See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2459 n.265 (questioning whether the
reasons that call into question the absurdity doctrine also call into question the recognition of
scrivener’s errors); John C. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Dec.
2002, art. 15, at 1–2 (arguing that textualists should refuse to recognize both “absurd results” and
scrivener’s errors); see also Gold, supra note 9, at 28 (arguing that the absurdity doctrine and the
scrivener’s error doctrine rest on the same normative foundation).
104

830

DOERFLER (DO NOT DELETE)

110:811 (2016)

6/24/2016 2:43 PM

The Scrivener’s Error

of the absurdity doctrine have no bearing on the treatment of absurdity as
evidence of linguistic error rather than as evidence of practical unwisdom.
Courts appeal to “absurdity” for different purposes. For that reason,
the absurdity doctrine is somewhat loosely defined. Roughly speaking, the
doctrine is that, if the application of a statute to a particular act would
“lead[] to an absurd result,” the statute “must be so construed as to avoid
the absurdity.”107 This is because the absurdity of the application “makes it
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include [within the
statute] the particular act.”108
As before, courts’ talk of “inten[tion]” here is ambiguous. Sometimes
courts treat absurdity as evidence that some statutory application is
contrary to Congress’s practical intention. In Holy Trinity, for example, the
Court found it “absurd” that Congress would intend to exclude alien clergy
given, among other things, that ours is “a religious nation.”109 Again, the
Court in that case conceded that exclusion of clergy was within the “letter”
of the statute, i.e., within the statute’s linguistic meaning. Nonetheless, the
Court treated the absurdity of the application to clergy as further evidence
that Congress would have exempted clergy from the prohibition had it
considered whether to do so.110 Given its general commitment to promoting
religion, Congress’s failure to exempt clergy was surely, in the Court’s
view, the result of limited foresight.
Much more recently, in Bond v. United States, the Court held that a
prohibition against the use of a “chemical weapon,” did not apply to the use
of chemicals “toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially
lethal” in a domestic dispute where defendant did not intend to kill her
victim, but instead hoped that her victim would touch the chemicals and
“develop an uncomfortable rash.”111 The statute defined “chemical weapon”
as any “toxic chemical” not used for a “peaceful purpose.”112 In turn, the
statute defined “toxic chemical” as “any chemical [that] through its
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation
or permanent harm to humans or animals.”113 These broad definitions
notwithstanding, the Court observed that, “[w]hen used in the manner here,
the chemicals in this case are not of the sort that an ordinary person would

107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459–60 (1892).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 470.
See id. at 472.
134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012)).
§ 229F(1)(A), (7)(A).
Id. § 229F(8)(A).
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associate with instruments of chemical warfare.”114 The Court reasoned
further that it was “reluctant to ignore the ordinary meaning of ‘chemical
weapon’ when doing so would transform a statute passed to implement the
international Convention on Chemical Weapons into one that also makes it
a federal offense to poison goldfish.”115 In other words, because Congress’s
practical intention was to implement “a treaty about chemical warfare and
terrorism,” not about “purely local crimes,”116 application of the statute to
the defendant and others similarly situated was simply beyond the pale.
Unlike in Holy Trinity, the Court in Bond denied the defendant’s act was
within the letter of the statute, declaring the statute “ambiguous.”117 As the
Court conceded, however, the statute was only “ambiguous,” in its view,
because of the “improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition.”118
Other times, courts treat absurdity as evidence that an application is
contrary to Congress’s communicative intention. In these cases, courts take
the absurdity of some candidate interpretation as reason to reject it in favor
of some other interpretation. So used, appeal to absurdity is a tool for
resolving (as opposed to creating) ambiguity. As I have argued more fully
elsewhere, courts do this all the time in “easy” cases, albeit unthinkingly.
To use an earlier example, section 102(b) of the ADA makes it unlawful
for an employer, when hiring, to discriminate against a “qualified
individual” on the basis of that individual’s disability.119 Courts read
“qualified individual,” as used, as referring to an individual qualified for
the position for which she applied. This is because alternate readings (e.g.,
an individual qualified to operate a motor vehicle, an individual qualified to
vote) are absurd insofar as they are completely irrelevant to Congress’s
apparent practical concern with employment discrimination against the
disabled (e.g., what does qualification to operate a motor vehicle have to do
with hiring decisions generally?).
As Manning has argued, to the extent that absurdity is treated as
evidence that an application is contrary to Congress’s practical intention, a
doctrine of rejecting “absurd” applications is just an instance of traditional

114

Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
Id. at 2091.
116 Id. at 2090.
117 See id.
118 Id.; see also id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Imagine what future courts
can do with that judge-empowering principle: Whatever has improbably broad, deeply serious, and
apparently unnecessary consequences . . . is ambiguous!”).
119 See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
115
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purposivism.120 Thus, all the reasons for doubting traditional purposivism
apply to the absurdity doctrine so applied.121
By contrast, to the extent that absurdity is treated as evidence that an
interpretation conflicts with the communicative intention expressed by a
statute, traditional purposivism is neither here nor there. As argued above,
even if courts must give effect to Congress’s specific instructions, judges
still must determine what specifically Congress instructs. This means,
among other things, sorting among candidate interpretations. And one
sensible way to sort among candidate interpretations is to privilege nonabsurd interpretations over interpretations that are absurd. Both textualists
and purposivists accept that language has meaning only in context.122 Both
accept further that context consists in part of Congress’s apparent practical
ends.123 Taken together, this suggests that, other things being equal, if a
candidate interpretation (e.g., that “qualified individual” refers to an
individual qualified to operate a motor vehicle) is absurd given Congress’s
practical ends (e.g., eliminating hiring discrimination against disabled
persons capable of performing the job), one should reject that interpretation
in favor of a linguistically plausible, nonabsurd interpretation (e.g., that
“qualified individual” refers to an individual qualified for the position for
which she applied).
Turn now to scrivener’s errors. Courts sometimes treat the absurdity
of what Congress said as evidence that Congress meant to say something
else. In such cases, appeal to absurdity is of the benign, evidence-ofconflict-with-communicative-intention variety. To use an earlier example,
if Congress’s practical intention is to create a time limit for appeal, it is
absurd for Congress to require parties to appeal “not less than 7 days” after
the decision.124 From this, a court will infer that Congress meant to say

120

See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2485–86.
As Bond illustrates, the Court’s handling of cases involving prosecutorial overreach thus
represents a notable exception to the shift away from traditional purposivism. See also Yates v. United
States, No. 13-7451, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2015) (plurality opinion) (holding that the provision of
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act prohibiting the destruction of any “tangible object” with the intent to obstruct a
federal investigation did not apply to the destruction of undersized red grouper by a commercial
fisherman attempting to avoid prosecution under federal conservation regulations).
122 Compare Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2002) (Katzmann, J.)
(“The meaning of a particular section in a statute can be understood in context with and by reference to
the whole statutory scheme, by appreciating how sections relate to one another.”), with Concast, Inc. v.
AMCA Sys., Inc., 959 F.2d 631, 632 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Language is an unruly tool
because meaning is contextual . . . .”).
123 See United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2013 (2011) (Breyer, J.) (“[W]hen read in
context and in light of the statute’s structure and purpose, we think it clear that Congress intended [the
provision] to apply automatically.”); Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 65, at 17 (observing
that “textualists will consult a statute’s purpose to clarify an ambiguity”).
124 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
121
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“more,” not “less.” Put slightly differently, a court will, in this case,
consider two candidate interpretations (e.g., “less” means less; “less”
means more). A court will then reject the absurd interpretation in favor of
the interpretation that is not absurd. And on the basis of that non-absurd
interpretation, a court will conclude that rejecting as untimely an appeal
filed in, say, five days, is contrary to Congress’s communicative intention.
More generally, when asking whether some statutory provision
contains a scrivener’s error, courts must resolve an ambiguity in Congress’s
communicative intention. On the one hand, Congress might have meant to
say what it said. On the other, it might have meant to say something else. If
the former possibility is absurd, courts will reject it in favor of the latter. In
such cases, Congress’s misstatement is thus “absolutely clear,” suggesting
that courts’ talk of “absurdity” in the area of scrivener’s errors is simply a
reflection of the current doctrine’s burden of proof. Regardless, in drawing
such inferences, courts leverage Congress’s apparent practical intention to
reveal Congress’s communicative intention. As discussed above, this is part
and parcel of giving effect to Congress’s specific instructions.125
III. WHEN TO RECOGNIZE A SCRIVENER’S ERROR?
So courts should recognize scrivener’s errors—but under what
conditions? The prevailing view, both among courts126 and scholars,127 is
that courts should recognize such an error if and only if the error is
“absolutely clear.” The reason offered is, again, that if a court were to
recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute at issue.
This should seem odd. Suppose that it is merely more likely than not
that some statute contains a scrivener’s error. In that case, courts should,
125 Contra Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 984 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (“That
Congress has written a deadline imprecisely, or even perversely, is not a sufficient reason to disregard
the enacted language. . . . Turning ‘less’ into ‘more’ would be a feat more closely associated with the
mutating commandments on the barn’s wall in Animal Farm than with sincere interpretation.”). In this
case, Judge Easterbrook goes on to express reasonable sympathy for the party who acted in accordance
with what Congress said. See id. at 985. That concern, however, pertains more to the values of fair
notice and lenity than to the nature of “sincere interpretation.” If, to use a previous example, one were
to refuse to remove both of one’s shoes at airport security, insisting that the sign says, “Please remove
your shoe,” one’s interpretation of that sign would be most insincere.
126 See, e.g., Owner–Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines, LLC, 556 F.3d 690, 694
(8th Cir. 2009); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092,
1097–98 (9th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Grp., 318 F.3d 1199, 1209–10
(10th Cir. 2003); In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1995). Prior to his retirement, Justice Stevens
appeared to advocate for a more permissive scrivener’s error doctrine. See, e.g., Pittston Coal Grp. v.
Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 129–31 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to
recognize a scrivener’s error in a regulation, characterizing his reading as “far more plausible” than the
majority’s). No member of the current Court has taken up Justice Stevens’s cause.
127 See Fried, supra note 10, at 614; Gold, supra note 9, at 28; Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
supra note 8, at 2459 n.265; Ohlendorf, supra note 11, at 155.
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according to the prevailing view, ignore the likely error. Yet by ignoring
the likely error, courts likely misinterpret—that is, “rewrite”—the statute at
issue. After all, in so doing, courts act as if Congress’s communicative
intention is something other than what it likely is.
What this simple example suggests is that courts should recognize a
scrivener’s error if and only if the error is more likely than not. By
recognizing all and only likely errors, courts likely get it right in each case.
Put another way, to refuse to recognize errors that are merely likely out of
caution is to ignore that both “false positives” and “false negatives” are
interpretive mistakes.128 If fidelity to Congress is the goal, courts should be
much more open to the possibility of congressional misstatement.
A. More Likely Than Not
1.

Assumptions.

a. Equal cost of error.—The permissive account just sketched
assumes that, with respect to scrivener’s error, both false positives and false
negatives are equally “costly.” In terms of correctness, this assumption is
straightforward. For the reasons explained in Part II,129 courts err both by
recognizing “errors” that are not and by failing to recognize ones that are.
Put another way, both false positives and false negatives are instances of
misinterpretation. In terms of practical consequences,130 the assumption of
equal cost is based upon the principle of insufficient reason.131 A priori,
there is no reason to think that recognition of “errors” that are not is any
more harmful than failure to recognize ones that are. Further, anecdotal
evidence suggests that false negatives are potentially quite harmful.132
b. Capacity to assess likelihood of error.—The permissive
account assumes further that courts can assess the likelihood that a statute
contains a scrivener’s error. If courts were bad at assessing the likelihood
of error, requiring them to act upon their subjective assessments would
plausibly yield bad results. For example, if courts wildly overestimated the
likelihood of error, they might do best to assume statutes contain no errors
128 Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff
and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 732 (1992) (observing that an interpretive rule concerning “absurd”
results must account for both “false positives,” i.e., “erroneous identifications of absurdity,” and “false
negatives,” i.e., “erroneous nonidentifications of absurdity”).
129 See supra Section II.A.
130 To the extent that such consequences are relevant to rules of statutory interpretation.
131 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 173–75 (2006) (observing that it is rational under certain circumstances to
assume that unknown probabilities are equal).
132 See, e.g., the discussion of King v. Burwell infra notes 160–10 and accompanying text.
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unless clear.133 More modestly, if the reliability of such assessments were
unknown, courts would plausibly do best not to consider whether statutes
contain less-than-clear errors to minimize judicial decision costs.134 Why
devote time and effort to the search if it might be futile? Helpfully, there is
every reason to believe that this assumption is true—that courts can assess
the likelihood that a statute contains an error. This is because making such
assessments involves only the exercise of basic linguistic competency. It is
a feature of ordinary conversation that speakers misspeak on occasion.
Listeners are, in turn, adept at identifying mistakes of expression. To
identify mistakes of expression in statutes, no additional skills are
required.135 As in ordinary conversation, the listener (here, courts) can infer,
on the basis of context, whether the speaker (here, Congress) meant to say
something other than what she did.136 Thus, as competent language users,
courts should be quite good at identifying misexpressions.137 In this respect,
identifying scrivener’s errors is quite unlike, say, parsing legislative
history, an area in which judicial competency is questionable at best.138
2.

Objections.

a. Increased decision costs.—The permissive account is subject
to at least three objections. First, one might object that the benefits of
identifying additional scrivener’s errors are outweighed by the
corresponding increase in judicial decision costs. Suppose, for example,

133

Assuming the degree of overestimation exceeds the degree of underestimation that results from
the current doctrine.
134 See VERMEULE, supra note 131, at 192 (observing that it may be rational to forgo consideration
of some types of information if the epistemic utility of considering such information is unknown and
the utility of considering some other type of available information is known).
135 Identifying mistakes in statutes perhaps requires specific familiarity with statutes, much in the
same way that identifying mistakes in instruction manuals perhaps requires specific familiarity with
instruction manuals. Needless to say, judges have more than a passing familiarity with the statutory
form.
136 As Andrei Marmor argues, it is possible that context is less informationally rich in the
legislative context than in the ordinary conversational context. See Marmor, supra note 80, at 434–35.
Be that as it may, speakers are adept at drawing the inferences one reasonably can on the basis of what
information is available.
137 Indeed, to the extent that the object of inquiry is Congress’s “objectified” intent, courts, as
competent, appropriately informed listeners, are correct in their assessments by definition. See, e.g.,
Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 67, at 424 (defining “objectified intent” as “the import that a
reasonable person conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the
enacted words”); Doerfler, supra note 63, at 26–30.
138 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 49 (2014) (“The paucity of judicial
knowledge about congressional rules and processes relating to the legislative process . . . is
striking . . . .”); VERMEULE, supra note 131, at 107–15 (cataloging reasons to question judicial
competency in evaluating legislative history); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 85 (2012) (lamenting judicial
“ignorance of how Congress works”).
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that scrivener’s errors are both rare and practically insignificant. Based on
that supposition, one might infer that the search for nonobvious errors is
not, or at least is not obviously, worth the cost. That inference, however,
would be mistaken. As discussed above, identifying scrivener’s errors is
just part of ordinary interpretation. When confronted with statutory text,
courts must determine what Congress means. This involves sorting among
candidate interpretations. And among those candidate interpretations will
be ones that do not fit a disquotational schema. Courts accept or reject
nondisquotational interpretations by considering the same information
(e.g., text, structure) and by exercising the same linguistic capacities they
use when accepting or rejecting any other. In this way, the search for
scrivener’s errors, obvious or not, does not require courts to do anything
they are not already doing.139 If a court opts to interpret some statutory
provision, the marginal decision cost of searching for likely scrivener’s
errors is thus minimal. Here, again, searching for scrivener’s errors
contrasts sharply with considering legislative history, where additional
decision costs are plausibly high.140
It is true that under a more permissive scrivener’s error doctrine,
courts likely would have (marginally141) more statutory provisions to
interpret. It is doubtful, however, that this increase in judicial workload
would be a bad thing. Under a more permissive doctrine, the set of
meritorious scrivener’s error arguments (e.g., errors that are more likely
than not) would be larger than under the current doctrine (e.g., errors that
are “absolutely clear”). And some of those newly meritorious claims would
presumably require courts to interpret provisions they would otherwise not.
Those new claims, however, are ones that courts should want to hear.
Under the current doctrine, the set of provisions implicated by those newly
meritorious claims are assumed to contain no errors. Because those new
claims only implicate errors that are more likely than not, this assumption
is, by definition, probably wrong. The new claims provide courts an
opportunity to correct this likely mistake. As illustrated by the figure
below, all cases falling between “very likely” and “somewhat likely”
probably come out incorrectly under the current doctrine, assuming courts
apply the doctrine faithfully. Subject to that same assumption (more on this

139 Relatedly, it is worth mentioning here that there is no reason to believe that sorting “somewhat
likely” errors from “somewhat unlikely” ones is any more difficult—and, hence, any more costly—than
sorting “absolutely clear” errors from “very likely” ones.
140 See VERMEULE, supra note 131, at 194 (noting “very high decision costs” involved in
consulting legislative history).
141 Given the general infrequency of scrivener’s errors, any increase in workload is likely to be
modest.
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below142), those cases likely come out correctly under the more permissive
doctrine recommended here.

More worrisome, under a more permissive doctrine, claims that were
previously frivolous (e.g., errors that are somewhat unlikely) would be
nonmeritorious but nonfrivolous. But there is no reason to think that the set
of nonmeritorious but nonfrivolous claims would be any larger under a
more permissive doctrine than under the current doctrine, i.e., that the set
of errors that are somewhat unlikely is substantially larger than the set of

142
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errors that are very likely.143 One should thus assume that the frequency
with which courts will have their time wasted would be roughly the same
under both.144
Go back now to the initial supposition of infrequency and
insignificance. Most statutory provisions do not contain scrivener’s
errors.145 There is, however, reason to believe that scrivener’s errors—at
least of a certain sort—occur with greater frequency under contemporary
legislative conditions. Contemporary statutes are enormous and complex,
containing countless interdependent provisions and cross-references. In
part, this is a function of subject matter. The United States healthcare
system, for example, is hugely complicated; it is thus unsurprising that
comprehensive healthcare legislation requires hundreds of pages in the
United States Code.146 In part, it is also a function of the contemporary
legislative process: as political scientist Barbara Sinclair has famously
documented, so-called unorthodox lawmaking, i.e., lawmaking outside of
the traditional committee process, is increasingly common.147 Among other
things, this includes increased use of omnibus legislation, which addresses
numerous, often unrelated subject matters within a single bill. Given the
size and complexity of contemporary statutes, it should come as no surprise
that Congress does not catch every error. The risk may be particularly high
for errors that result in cases of incomplete amendment—that is,
unintended mismatches between one provision and another.148

143 Given the general infrequency of scrivener’s errors, one suspects that there is clearly or,
perhaps, very likely no scrivener’s error in the vast majority of cases. How the cases are distributed
beyond that, however, is difficult to say without significant empirical inquiry.
144 More still, even if there are, for some unspecified reason, more “somewhat unlikely” errors than
there are “very likely” errors, the difference would have to be substantial for the increase in decision
cost to offset the accuracy gains that would result from the more permissive approach.
145 Just as most police encounters do not involve brutality and most purchases are not the product
of consumer fraud.
146 See Paul Clement, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Breadth and Depth
of Federal Power, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 887, 887 (2012) (“[T]his Act is hundreds of pages
long.”). And tens of thousands of pages in the Federal Register to implement that legislation. See Joseph
Friedman et al., A Crystal Ball: Managed Care Litigation in Light of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, HEALTH LAW., Dec. 2014, at 1, 1.
147 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2012).
148 As Jarrod Shobe observes, the legislative drafting process has become increasingly
professionalized over the last several decades, with, among other things, increasing reliance on
professional drafters in the form of legislative counsel. Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory
Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 826–31 (2014). As
Shobe suggests, this increasing reliance on legislative counsel to craft precise wording plausibly
reduces the number of scrivener’s errors at the level of the individual word or sentence, see id. at 875,
even as an increasingly complex legislative process makes other, more structural kinds of scrivener’s
errors (e.g., incomplete amendments). When combined with the complicated nature of both
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b.

Increased
judicial
willfulness
or
motivated
reasoning.—Second, one might object that a more permissive
scrivener’s error doctrine would invite judicial “willfulness” or “motivated
reasoning,” thereby negating any gains in terms of correctness, i.e., fidelity
to legislative intent. A standard justification for rigid interpretive rules is
that they limit judicial discretion, preventing judges from substituting their
political preferences for those of the politically accountable
legislature.149The concern here is that if courts are permitted to recognize
scrivener’s errors that are merely likely, then judges with strong policy
preferences of their own will start to see “likely” errors where there are
none. The current scrivener’s error doctrine, this line of reasoning
concludes, thus operates as a bulwark against judicial willfulness or
motivated reasoning.
The concern about increased willfulness or motivated reasoning
suffers from roughly the same defect as the “rewriting” concern that
motivates the current, restrictive doctrine. Just as the concern about
“rewriting” ignores that courts can misinterpret in either direction, the
concern about increased willfulness or motivated reasoning ignores that
courts can be biased in either direction. To elaborate, for the sake of
argument, that courts can mischaracterize slightly the probability of an
interpretation without reputational cost (e.g., that courts can, without
embarrassment, characterize a somewhat unlikely interpretation as “likely”
or a merely likely interpretation as “very likely”). In that case, lowering the
burden of proof for a scrivener’s error would make it easier for motivated
courts to recognize errors where probably there are none (e.g., courts could
recognize errors that are somewhat unlikely by mischaracterizing them as
“likely”). At the same time, lowering the burden of proof would also, and
to the same degree, make it more difficult for motivated courts to refuse to
recognize errors where errors probably exist (e.g., courts could no longer
refuse to recognize errors that are clear by mischaracterizing them as “very
likely”). There is no a priori reason to think that the policy preferences of
courts are advanced more often by imagining errors than by turning a blind
eye to actual ones. Nor is there any reason a priori to think that there are,
say, more somewhat unlikely errors that could be mischaracterized as

contemporary statutes and the contemporary lawmaking process, this suggests scrivener’s errors fall
increasingly into the category of incomplete amendment, as opposed to, say, slip of the tongue.
149 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 544 (1988) (arguing that
“formalism disables some decisionmakers from considering some factors that may appear important to
them,” and so “achieves its value when it is thought desirable to narrow the decisional opportunities and
the decisional range of a certain class of decisionmakers”); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be
Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 638 (1999) (observing that “formalism” involves a
commitment to “constraining the discretion of judges in deciding cases”).
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“somewhat likely” than, say, clear errors that could be mischaracterized as
merely “very likely.” There is thus no reason to think that the current
doctrine protects any better against willfulness or motivated reasoning than
would a doctrine requiring error recognition if and only if error is more
likely than not.
In terms of comparative accuracy, the superiority of the permissive
over the restrictive doctrine thus turns out not to hinge on the assumption
that courts apply each doctrine faithfully. To illustrate using the earlier
figure, assume that courts can successfully mischaracterize a possible error
by one degree of probability (e.g., that courts can mischaracterize a “likely”
error as either “very likely” or “somewhat likely”). Under that assumption,
the best-case scenario for the restrictive approach is that courts
systematically overestimate the likelihood of error, mischaracterizing all
“very likely” errors as “absolutely clear.” In that scenario, courts still likely
reach the incorrect outcome—a false negative—in cases ranging from
“likely” to “somewhat likely.” By contrast, the worst-case scenario for the
permissive approach is that courts systematically underestimate the
likelihood of error, misconstruing all “somewhat unlikely” errors as
“somewhat likely.” In that scenario, courts likely reach the incorrect
outcome—a false positive—in those “somewhat unlikely” cases. A priori,
there is no reason to believe that there are more “somewhat unlikely” errors
than there are “somewhat likely” errors, let alone “somewhat likely” and
“likely” errors combined. Therefore, even in improbably unfavorable
scenarios, adherence to the proposed permissive doctrine results in greater
accuracy than does adherence to the current restrictive one.
c. Increased congressional misconduct.—Last, one might object
that the benefits of a more permissive doctrine would be negated by a
resulting increase in congressional misconduct. Another argument for rigid
interpretive rules generally is that they compel Congress to draft more
carefully.150 One might thus argue that adherence to a more permissive
scrivener’s error doctrine would only produce more scrivener’s errors since

150 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 105, at 51 (“The canons . . . promote clearer
drafting.”); Sunstein, supra note 65, at 424 (noting the argument that adherence to “plain meaning”
“warn[s] the lawmakers to be careful about statutory language”); cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–65 (1999) (arguing that the promise of judicial review
may promote legislative irresponsibility and distort legislative deliberation); James B. Thayer,
Constitutionality of Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court, 38 NATION 314, 315 (1884) (“It is a
common saying in our legislative bodies when any constitutional point is raised, ‘Oh, the courts will set
that right’ . . . .”).
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Congress would expect courts to correct its mistakes.151 The problem with
this type of argument is that, as an empirical matter, Congress is
increasingly unresponsive to judicial “discipline.”152 In a recent study, for
example, Richard Hasen finds a sharp drop-off of congressional overrides
of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions since the 1990s.153
Hasen attributes the decrease in large part to a corresponding increase in
political polarization within Congress.154 As Hasen observes, “[i]n a highly
polarized atmosphere and with Senate rules usually requiring sixty votes to
change the status quo, the Court’s word on the meaning of statutes is now
final almost as often as its word on constitutional interpretation.”155 Hasen’s
observation is consistent with more general findings by political scientists
that increased congressional polarization has resulted in unprecedented
levels of partisan gridlock.156 Add to this survey results from Abbe Gluck
and Lisa Bressman suggesting that participants in the legislative drafting
process are largely insensitive to judicial interpretive rules, and the
disciplining argument looks weaker still.157 On the other side of the ledger,
the Court’s increased attention to text in recent decades has corresponded
to increased professionalization of legislative drafting process, and, in turn,
increased attention to text on the part of legislative drafters.158 There,
however, causation plausibly runs in the other direction, with increased

151 See Nelson, supra note 67, at 381–82 (“[T]he courts’ reluctance to identify and correct ‘drafting
errors’ may encourage members of Congress or their staffs to spend more time proofreading and poring
over each individual bill.”).
152 Nourse, supra note 138, at 138–41 (calling this the “Let’s Discipline Congress” argument).
153 See Hasen, supra note 25, at 209; accord Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1317, 1319 (2014) (finding a similar drop-off beginning with the 106th Congress in 1999).
154 See Hasen, supra note 25, at 209 (observing that “partisanship seems to have strongly
diminished the opportunities for bipartisan overrides of Supreme Court cases”); see also Christiansen
& Eskridge, Jr., supra note 153, at 1332 (observing that the drop-off followed immediately President
Clinton’s House impeachment and Senate trial in 1998).
155 Hasen, supra note 25, at 209.
156 See, e.g., Binder, supra note 23, at 97 (observing that “levels of legislative deadlock have
steadily risen over the past half century” with “[s]talemate at times now reach[ing] across three-quarters
of the salient issues on Washington’s agenda”).
157 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
932–37 (2013) (finding that drafters disregard, for example, the rule against superfluities, the
presumption of consistent usage, and the consideration of dictionary definitions, and noting that such
findings “run[] contrary to popular arguments that a strict textual approach may incentivize Congress to
draft more carefully”).
158 See Shobe, supra note 148, at 820–34 (observing increasing reliance by Congress on legislative
counsel).
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professionalization making careful attention to text a much more defensible
judicial methodological approach.159
*

*

*

In sum, the simple, permissive account proposed here is that courts
recognize scrivener’s errors if and only if an error is more likely than not.
In so doing, courts minimize interpretive mistake. As discussed above, the
case for the permissive account rests on various assumptions. Each of those
assumptions is, however, thoroughly supported. Some arguments in
support—bidirectional willfulness, congressional indifference—are
generic, applying with equal force against different formalist doctrines.
Others—judicial competence, minimal decision costs—are specific to
scrivener’s errors. In combination, these arguments, if nothing else, place
the burden of justification on the proponent of the more restrictive doctrine.
Something other than a fear of rewriting is owed to justify deviation from a
more-likely-than-not baseline.
B. Distorted Argumentation
In addition to interpretive mistake, the current scrivener’s error
doctrine promotes distorted argumentation. Because courts cannot correct
even a very likely scrivener’s error, the doctrine forces litigants to advance,
and courts to adopt as precedent, deeply distorted interpretive rationales on
pains of reaching the wrong outcome in a given case. This sort of distortion
was on full display in the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell,
which involved a challenge to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule
interpreting the insurance subsidies provision of the PPACA. Such
distortion is likely to feature in prominent cases going forward, as
opponents of ambitious executive action search for defects in the enormous
and complex statutes upon which such action relies.
1. King v. Burwell.—In March 2010, after protracted negotiations,
Congress enacted the PPACA.160 Among other things, the PPACA
implements a trio of interdependent reforms, the purpose of which is to
induce those ineligible for coverage from either the government or an
employer to purchase health insurance on the individual market. First, the
159 See id. at 853 (arguing that “[t]extualism rose in prominence during [the 1980s through the
1990s] because statutes became clearer and more detailed due to Congress’s increased institutional
capacity”); see also id. at 844 & tbl.3 (observing a dramatic increase in legislative staff between 1970
and 1980).
160 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
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Act prohibits insurers from denying coverage or increasing premiums on
the basis of preexisting conditions (community rating).161 Second, it
imposes a tax penalty on nonexempt individuals who fail to maintain
coverage (individual mandate).162 Third, it provides subsidies in the form of
tax credits for the purchase of insurance by low-income persons
(subsidies).163 On the one hand, community rating and subsidies make
insurance affordable for all by ensuring a price not in excess of a
reasonable percentage of income. On the other, the individual mandate
makes the provision of affordable insurance financially feasible for insurers
by ensuring a broad risk pool.
To further facilitate the purchase of insurance by individuals and small
businesses, the PPACA creates state-specific marketplaces, known as
“Exchanges,” on which customers can compare and purchase policies.
Under section 1311 of the Act, “[e]ach State shall . . . establish an
[Exchange] for the State.”164 Because, however, Congress cannot require
states to implement federal laws,165 if a state refuses or is unable to set up
an Exchange, section 1321 of the Act provides that the federal government,
through the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), “shall . . .
establish and operate such Exchange within the State.”166
Exchanges are also the mechanism through which the Act makes
subsidies available to those eligible. More specifically, § 36B of the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), enacted as part of the PPACA, makes
available tax credits for persons who purchase health insurance “through an
Exchange established by the State under [Section] 1311 of the [Act].”167
In May 2012, the IRS issued a final rule interpreting § 36B as
authorizing the agency to grant tax credits to persons who purchased
insurance through either a state-run or a federally facilitated Exchange.168
Shortly thereafter, opponents of the PPACA challenged the rule, arguing
that it was invalid because, according to its plain language, § 36B
authorizes subsidies for insurance purchased through state-run Exchanges
alone.169 At the time, thirty-four states relied upon federally facilitated
161

42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
163 Id. § 36B.
164 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1).
165 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
166 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
167 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (footnote omitted).
168 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (May 23, 2012) (codified at
26 C.F.R. § 1.36B–2; 45 C.F.R. § 155.20).
169 This argument appears to have been articulated first by Jonathan Adler, a legal academic, and
Michael Cannon, a health policy expert at the Cato Institute. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F.
162
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Exchanges.170 In 2014, more than five million people purchased insurance
through such an Exchange, with the vast majority relying upon subsidies.171
Hence, if the challenge were to succeed (and Congress and states were to
stand pat), millions of Americans would suddenly be unable to afford
health insurance.172 For that reason, the vast majority of those Americans
would become exempt from the individual mandate.173 Under these
conditions, the individual mandate would plausibly fail to produce a broad
enough risk pool to avoid adverse selection, thus resulting in “death
spirals” as premiums skyrocket.174
As word of the challenge spread, the press quickly characterized the
dispute as involving a possible “typo.”175 According to the Washington
Post, for example:
The debate now centers on whether [§ 36B] has a drafting error. Did the
federal government mean to count federally-established marketplaces there
and miss a word? Or did they actually mean to send insurance subsidies only
to states that did the heavy lifting?176

In other words, according to the press, the question was whether
§ 36B contains a scrivener’s error. Did Congress intend to limit subsidies to
insurance purchased only through state-run Exchanges? Or is it just that
Congress meant to say, “established by the State under section 1311 or by
the Secretary under section 1321”?
There is, at least, a colorable argument that Congress meant to say
what it said. As opponents of the law observe, the House initially enacted a
bill under which the federal government would create a national Exchange,

Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the
PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 123 (2013).
170 King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 25, 2015).
171 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Subsidies and the Survival of the ACA—Divided Decisions on
Premium Tax Credits, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 891 (2014).
172 Id.; King, slip op. at 4–5.
173 King, slip op. at 5 (“[W]ithout the tax credits, the cost of buying insurance would exceed eight
percent of income for a large number of individuals, which would exempt them from the coverage
requirement.”).
174 See id. at 13–15.
175 Paul Krugman, Death by Typo: The Latest Frivolous Attack on Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/opinion/paul-krugman-the-latest-frivolous-attack-onobamacare.html [http://perma.cc/8LD2-MGKD].
176 Sarah Kliff, Could One Word Take Down Obamacare?, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 16,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/16/could-a-missing-word-takedown-obamacare/ [http://perma.cc/JH3X-8V2A]; see also Robert Pear, Brawling Over Health Care
Moves to Rules on Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/us/
critics-of-health-care-law-prepare-to-battle-over-insurance-exchange-subsidies.html [http://perma.cc/
8FC3-J4LM] (quoting health policy expert Timothy S. Jost as saying that “Congress had made ‘a
drafting error’ that should be obvious to anyone who understands the new health care law”).
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though providing states the option to establish their own. This approach
proved untenable in the Senate, which, opponents allege, insisted on greater
incentive for state participation.177 Hence, opponents continue, Congress
ultimately “used a variety of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to induce states to
establish Exchanges voluntarily,”178 including, for example, federal grants
to states for “activities . . . related to establishing an [Exchange],”179 and,
opponents allege, a prohibition against restricting eligibility for state
Medicaid programs until “an Exchange established by the State under
section [1311] of [the Act] is fully operational.”180 Most important,
opponents insist, Congress conditioned federal subsidies on a state’s
establishing and operating an Exchange, believing this to be an offer states
could not refuse.181
Again, the above argument is colorable. For that reason, the restrictive
reading of § 36B is not “absurd”—in other words, this is not an “absolutely
clear” case of scrivener’s error. It is, however, unlikely for reasons Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in King, observed. First, subsidies
are, as discussed above, one “leg” of the “three-legged stool.”182 It is
doubtful that Congress would intend that the stool collapse in a state if that
state failed to establish an Exchange.183 Withholding federal funds is one
thing. Setting off death spirals is another. Second, opponents’ reading of
§ 36B would give rise to various anomalies. Among other things, the Act
would thus require the creation of federally facilitated Exchanges on which
there would be no “qualified individuals” eligible to shop,184 as well as the

177 While opponents frame the argument in terms of Congress’s actual, historical intent, see infra
notes 178–81 and accompanying text, the argument can be translated for the most part into one having
to do with objectified intent. See supra note 67.
178 Brief for Petitioners at 2, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015), 2014 WL 7386999,
at *2.
179 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a)(3) (2012).
180 Id. § 1396a(gg)(1). This argument is to some degree circular since it assumes that the phrase
“established by the State under section 1311” should be attributed the same significance as opponents
urge in the context of § 36B. In other words, the argument assumes not only that the phrase should be
interpreted the same way in both contexts, but also that theirs is the interpretation that should prevail.
181 King, slip op. at 18 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, supra note 178, at 36). Opponents urge that
states might not have refused had the IRS not issued the rule it did, thereby eliminating the incentive to
accept. Id.
182 E.g., Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially
Repealing the Affordable Care Act, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 5, 2010),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/report/2010/08/05/8226/health-care-reform-is-athree-legged-stool/ [https://perma.cc/WY5U-JXN3]; see also King, slip op. at 1 (characterizing the
reforms as “interlocking”).
183 See King, slip op. at 15 (“[P]etitioners’ interpretation . . . would destabilize the individual
insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that
Congress designed the Act to avoid.”).
184 Id. at 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(2)(A), 18032(f)(1)(A)).
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reporting of information for a “[r]econciliation” of tax credits that could
never occur.185 For these reasons, it is all too likely that the restriction of
subsides to insurance purchased on an Exchange “established by the State
under section 1311” was accidental, not intentional.186 Specifically, it
appears that § 36B, along with other portions of the Act,187 were drafted on
the assumption that the PPACA would provide only for state-run
exchanges.188 Later, the Act was amended to allow for federally facilitated
exchanges as a fallback.189 That edit, however, was implemented only
partially despite its being intended to have global effect. In other words, it
appears that the absence of a reference to exchanges “established by the
Secretary” is an instance of incomplete amendment.
Regardless, because the restrictive reading of § 36B is not “absurd,”
that § 36B contains a scrivener’s error is not “absolutely clear.” As Justice
Scalia emphasized in dissent, a scrivener’s error argument was thus
unavailable to the Government or supporting amici under the current
doctrine.190 This left both to pursue other, less plausible strategies.191 The

185

Id. at 13–14 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3)).
Further, to the extent that actual, historical intent matters, it appears that participants in the
drafting process were utterly unaware of “any distinction between federal and state exchanges in terms
of the availability of subsidies.” Robert Pear, Four Words That Imperil Health Care Law Were All a
Mistake, Writers Now Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/
politics/contested-words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html [http://perma.cc/
VS44-TBQM] (quoting former Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R–ME)). “Some described the [language of
§ 36B] as ‘inadvertent,’ ‘inartful’ or ‘a drafting error.’” Id.
In support of their “carrots” and “sticks” argument, opponents insist that certain swing voters, in
particular Senator Ben Nelson (R–NE), did intend that federal and state exchanges be treated different.
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 178, at 4 (citing Carrie Budoff Brown, Nelson: National Exchange
a Dealbreaker, POLITICO: LIVE PULSE (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.politico.com/livepulse/0110/
Nelson_National_exchange_a_dealbreaker.html [http://perma.cc/T6HF-KSFN]). Opponents cite
Senator Nelson’s opposition to a national exchange, inferring from this opposition a commitment to
“keep[ing] the federal government out of the process,” and, in turn, to providing “serious incentives to
induce . . . state participation.” Id. The problem with opponents’ inference is that, on any reading, the
PPACA is consistent with Senator Nelson’s opposition to a national exchange, authorizing only the
creation of state-specific federally facilitated exchanges. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
187 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21) (defining “Exchange” as a healthcare exchange
“established under section [1311] of this [Act]”).
188 Here the most direct evidence is the compulsory language of § 1311. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 18031(b)(1) (providing that “[e]ach State shall . . . establish an [Exchange] for the State” (emphasis
added)).
189 Perhaps upon recognizing that the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering doctrine prevents
Congress from compelling a state to establish an exchange. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
933 (1997).
190 See King, slip op. at 17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But § 36B does not come remotely close to
satisfying that demanding standard. It is entirely plausible that tax credits were restricted to state
Exchanges deliberately—for example, in order to encourage States to establish their own Exchanges.
We therefore have no authority to dismiss the terms of the law as a drafting fumble.”).
191 Once this strategic reality became apparent, the press promptly corrected course. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth B. Wydra, Five Myths About King v. Burwell, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015),
186
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Government and some amici, for example, argued that, as used, the phrase
“‘Exchange established by the State under section 1311’ is a term of art”
that includes federally facilitated Exchanges.192 Again, under section 1321,
if a state fails to establish the “required Exchange,” the Secretary must
“establish and operate such Exchange within the State.”193 From this, the
Government and amici inferred that the Secretary acts as a state’s
“statutory surrogate” in establishing an Exchange, and so that an Exchange
established by the Secretary just is an “Exchange established by the State
under Section [1311].”194 Perhaps. Suppose, however, that Ann instructs
Beth to purchase a blueberry pie from Hi-Rise Bakery but instructs Carl to
purchase “such pie” from Petsi Pies if Beth fails. If Carl goes on to
purchase “such pie,” is that pie “purchased by Beth”? Is it also “from HiRise”? Doubtful.195
Other supporting amici argued in addition that the restrictive reading
of § 36B should be rejected for reasons of federalism.196 Under Gregory v.
Ashcroft, federal courts must “be certain of Congress’[s] intent before
finding that federal law overrides” “the usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers.”197 According to these other amici, reading § 36B
restrictively would run afoul of the principle since, on that reading,
Congress “buried” the condition on subsidies “in a provision of the tax
code directed to individuals, not States.”198 Because states must receive fair
notice of the consequences under federal law of declining to participate in a
federal program, these other amici reasoned, § 36B must not be read in this
way.199 Again, perhaps. The federalism canon applies only if the statutory

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-king-v-burwell/2015/02/26/a1f8472e-ad8e11e4-abe8-e1ef60ca26de_story.html [http://perma.cc/4ZH5-PCQH] (listing as a “myth” the dispute that
“Congress made a mistake when it wrote the [PPACA]”).
192 Textualism Brief, supra note 17, at 15; accord Brief for the Respondents, supra note 17, at 13.
193 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (emphasis added).
194 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 17, at 13; accord Textualism Brief, supra note 17, at 14.
195 The Government and supporting amici argued further that the definitional provision, which
provides that “[t]he term ‘Exchange’ means an American Health Benefit Exchange established under
section [1311],” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21) (emphasis added), shows that a federally facilitated
“Exchange” is, in the relevant sense, an Exchange “established under section [1311].” See Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 17, at 23; Textualism Brief, supra note 17, at 15. This argument, however,
proves too much, since accepting it would render § 36B’s language of “Exchange established by the
State under section 1311” redundant. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (emphasis added). Far more likely is that the
definitional provision contains the same scrivener’s error as § 36B.
196 Federalism Brief, supra note 18.
197 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243
(1985)).
198 Federalism Brief, supra note 18, at 4.
199 See id. at 3–4.
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provision at issue is “ambiguous.”200 It is doubtful, however, that § 36B is
ambiguous once a scrivener’s error reading is off the table. For that
provision to be so ambiguous, the Government’s “statutory surrogate”
reading would, as these other amici acknowledged, have to be fairly
available. Yet, for the reasons above, the availability of that reading is
questionable.
Despite its apparent weakness, the majority in King accepted the
Government’s “statutory surrogate” argument.201 Justice Scalia took them
to task for it in dissent.202 Perhaps aware he was on weak interpretive
ground, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that § 36B was “inartful[lly]
draft[ed].”203 As Justice Scalia replied, however, unless the inartful drafting
in question amounted to a scrivener’s error—a claim unavailable here—it
is unclear how that concession advances the majority’s argument.204 The
majority did not reach the federalism arguments raised by amici. One
suspects those arguments would have been no more persuasive to the
dissenters.205
Limitations aside, the above arguments were the right ones for
supporting litigants to make (and for sympathetic Justices to accept). That
should, however, be troubling insofar as interpretation is supposed to be
about careful reading. Consider first the “statutory surrogate” argument.
Under ordinary circumstances, the plain contrast between section 1311
(state-run exchanges) and section 1321 (federally facilitated exchanges) in
combination with § 36B’s specific reference to section 1311 would be
enough to infer that § 36B excludes section 1321. To draw that inference
would just be to give effect to the precise words that Congress chose.206 As
argued above, there is good reason to think that, in this case, Congress
chose its words not precisely but accidentally. Because of the current
scrivener’s error doctrine, however, that possibility was off the table.

200

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470.
See King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 10 (U.S. June 25, 2015) (“By using the phrase
‘such Exchange,’ Section 18041 instructs the Secretary to establish and operate the same Exchange that
the State was directed to establish under Section 18031.”).
202 See id. at 6–9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
203 Id. at 14 (majority opinion).
204 Id. at 17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps sensing the dismal failure of its efforts to show that
‘established by the State’ means ‘established by the State or the Federal Government,’ the Court tries to
palm off the pertinent statutory phrase as ‘inartful drafting.’ This Court, however, has no free-floating
power ‘to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr.,
540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004))).
205 Cf. id. at 13 (“Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent they help clarify an
otherwise ambiguous provision. Could anyone maintain with a straight face that § 36B is unclear?”).
206 To use the earlier analogy, if Ann says that she wants a blueberry pie from “Hi-Rise Bakery,”
she wants a blueberry pie from Hi-Rise Bakery.
201
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Instead, the Government and supporting amici were left to argue that
Congress chose its words precisely, but that one should not draw the
inference one normally would. This form of argument is worrisome since,
if accepted, it threatens to undercut Congress’s ability to communicate
anything specific. After all, if “section 1311” can refer to section 1311 and
section 1321, it starts to feel like “[w]ords no longer have meaning.”207
Next, consider the federalism argument. As mentioned above, clear
statement rules such as the federalism canon apply only if the statutory
provision at issue is unclear. The problem is that courts sometimes see
unclarity precisely because some value (e.g., federalism, rule of law)
corresponding to such a rule is implicated.208 This is a serious concern to
the extent one opposes the rewriting of statutes in the name of lofty
constitutional values. As King illustrates, the current doctrine compels
litigants to argue that texts are unclear in ways they are not. As a result, it is
unsurprising that litigants invoke clear statement rules toward that end.
Again, the current doctrine produces more “interpretive distortions”209
rather than fewer.210
2. Past Cases.—King is not the first case of its kind. Start with a
casebook staple. In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,211
the question before the Court was whether the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) applies to the American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary, which regularly consults with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding potential nominees for federal
judgeships.212 FACA requires federal “advisory committees” to open
meetings, balance membership, and release public reports.213 In turn, FACA
defines “advisory committee” as any group “established or utilized by the

207 King, slip op. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Words no longer have meaning if an Exchange that
is not established by a State is ‘established by the State.’ It is hard to come up with a clearer way to
limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by the State.’”).
208 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014); cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession,
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41–42 (arguing that historical practice shapes the Court’s perceptions of textual
clarity and ambiguity).
209 King, slip op. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “endur[ing] whatever
interpretive distortions it takes in order to correct a supposed flaw in the statutory machinery”).
210 All the more so if one is skeptical of clear statement rules generally. See John F. Manning,
Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 399 (2010) (arguing that “clear
statement rules rest on the mistaken premise that the Constitution contains freestanding values . . . apart
from the specific terms of the clauses from which the Court derives them”).
211 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
212 Id. at 443.
213 Id. at 446–47.
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President” or an agency to give advice on public questions.214 There is “no
doubt,” the Court conceded, that the DOJ “makes use” of the Standing
Committee, and thus “utilizes” it in the ordinary sense.215 Nonetheless,
because a “literalistic” reading of “utilize” would encompass groups such
as the President’s own political party, an outcome “Congress could [not]
conceivably have intended,”216 the Court read the term somewhat
creatively, treating it as a sort of synonym of “establish.”217
“Today, Public Citizen is taught as a controversial case,” an instance
of Holy Trinity-style purposivism.218 But were it not for the current
scrivener’s error doctrine, the Court could have avoided such reasoning
altogether. As Victoria Nourse observes, as a historical matter, “[t]he term
‘utilize’ first appears in the conference committee report resolving House
and Senate differences on FACA.”219 Going to conference, the Senate
version of FACA applied to groups “established or organized” by the
Executive.220 The House version, by contrast, used the term “established.”221
As Nourse observes further, conference committees are constrained by
rules that prohibit change to the text of a bill where both houses have
agreed to the same language.222 Against this backdrop, it is more likely than
not that the substitution of the term “utilize” for “organized” in the final
version of FACA is a simple scrivener’s error. If the substitution had been
intentional, it would probably have violated the rule against substantive
changes to agreed-upon text. If, instead, the substitution was accidental—
predicated, maybe, on the false belief that “utilize” and “organize” are
rough synonyms—the conference committee plainly stayed within its
jurisdiction. And while the former assessment falls short of absurd—it is,

214

5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (2012).
Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 452.
216 Id. at 463–64.
217 See id. at 462.
218 Nourse, supra note 138, at 93; see also Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 472 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“To the student of statutory construction, this move is a familiar one. It is, as the
Court identifies it, the classic Holy Trinity argument.”); Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8,
at 2429–30 (criticizing the Court’s reliance upon the absurdity doctrine in Public Citizen).
219 Nourse, supra note 138, at 93.
220 Id. at 94 (citing Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 461).
221 Id. (citing Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 459).
222 Id. at 94–95 (citing JOHN V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 111-157, R. XXII(9), at 37 (2011); U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING
RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, R. XXVIII(2)(a), at 52 (2011)).
215
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of course, conceivable that a conference committee would flout or interpret
aggressively the applicable rules—the latter is more plausible.223
Consider next Holloway v. United States.224 In that case, the Court was
asked to construe the federal carjacking statute. As written, the statute
prohibits carjacking “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm.”225 The question before the Court was whether that prohibition
applies to someone who intends to kill or seriously injure only “if
necessary to effect a carjacking.”226 In Holloway, the only actual violence
consisted of the defendant punching one of his victims in the face.227 At
trial, the jury was instructed that, lack of actual violence notwithstanding,
so long as the defendant was willing to kill or seriously injure “if the
alleged victims had refused to turn over their cars,” that was enough for a
conviction.228
As Justice Scalia argued in dissent, the interpretation expressed by the
jury instructions is difficult to square with the language of the statute. If,
for example, one has a friend who is seriously ill, one does not “intend” to
attend her funeral next week.229 This is so, Justice Scalia argued further,
even if one does intend to go to her funeral if she dies.230 Linguistic
awkwardness notwithstanding, the Court held that the statute applies even
in absence of an “unconditional” intent to kill or seriously injure.231
According to Justice Stevens, “commonsense” suggests that Congress
“intended to criminalize a broader scope of conduct than attempts to assault
or kill in the course of automobile robberies.”232 For that reason, Justice
Stevens concluded, “intent” must be read to encompass “conditional”
intent.233
The language at issue in Holloway is likely attributable to a
scrivener’s error. As enacted in 1992, the statute applied to anyone who,

223

Nourse argues that, attending to congressional rules, a court “should interpret ‘utilize’ precisely
as a member of Congress would interpret it—as making no significant change to ‘established or
organized.’” Nourse, supra note 138, at 95. What Nourse fails to explain, however, is how attention to
such rules alleviates the linguistic awkwardness of reading the term “utilize” in this way.
224 526 U.S. 1 (1999).
225 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012).
226 Holloway, 526 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added).
227 Id. at 4.
228 Id. (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 7–8 (majority opinion).
232 Id. at 7; see also id. at 12 ([W]e . . . think it unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to
enact such a truncated version of an important criminal statute.”).
233 Id. at 8.
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“possessing a firearm[,] . . . takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.”234 In 1994,
Congress amended the statute, eliminating the firearm requirement and
adding the death penalty for cases in which death results.235 Congress also
added the language at issue here, plausibly in an effort to avoid challenge
under the Eighth Amendment.236 As the district court observed, however,
and as Justice Scalia conceded in dissent, the language at issue was likely
intended to apply only to carjackings resulting in death.237 Hence, it is likely
that what Congress meant to say was that:
Whoever takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by
force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall (1) be
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, . . . [or] (3) if death
results, be . . . sentenced to death if she acted with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm.

So read, the statute would have thus applied to the defendant’s actions
regardless of any intention to kill or seriously injure.238
Again, the above reading is the one that Congress likely intended. It is,
however, at least possible that Congress meant to say what it said. As
Justice Scalia observed in dissent, “[t]he era when this statute was passed
contained well publicized instances . . . of carjackings in which the
perpetrators senselessly harmed the car owners when that was entirely
unnecessary to the crime.”239 Hence, it is possible that “Congress meant to
reach—as it said—the carjacker who intended to kill.”240 Because the
presence of a scrivener’s error was not “absolutely clear,” current doctrine
precluded the majority from reading the statute as Congress likely intended.
In turn, it was forced to adopt a strained reading that approximated, in its
legal effect, the correct one.

234 Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 101, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012)).
235 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796,
1970 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
236 See United States v. Holloway, 921 F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that in the
absence of that language at issue, the statute would have authorized the death penalty for an accomplice
who neither killed a victim nor intended to kill or harm the victim (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982))), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997), aff’d sub nom.
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999).
237 Holloway, 526 U.S. at 19 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holloway, 921 F. Supp. at 158. Here, the
best evidence is that Congress’s amendment purports to amend “Section 2119(3),” the subsection of the
original (and existing) statute that is a penalty provision applicable to cases in which death results.
108 Stat. at 1970.
238 Needless to say, the death penalty was unavailable either way.
239 Holloway, 526 U.S. at 18–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 20.
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Last, take a simple case. In United States v. Locke,241 the question was
whether a requirement that a notice of complaint be filed “prior to
December 31” is satisfied by a notice filed on December 31. The Court
held that it is not, reasoning that a “literal reading” of the requirement
would not “produce a result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.’”242 As the Court reasoned, “the purpose of a filing deadline would
be just as well served by nearly any date a court might choose as by the
date Congress has in fact set out in the statute.”243 Here again, the language
at issue likely reflects a scrivener’s error.244 As Justice Stevens argued in
dissent, “[t]he statutory scheme requires periodic filings on a calendar-year
basis,” and “[t]he end of the calendar year is, of course, correctly described
either as ‘prior to the close of business on December 31,’ or ‘on or before
December 31.’”245 More still, the accidental substitution of “prior to” for
one of the aforementioned phrases is a familiar sort of linguistic mistake.
Finally, it is hard to think of “any rational basis for omitting just one day
from the period in which an annual filing may be made.”246 Because,
however, it is at least conceivable that Congress meant to say “prior to,”
Justice Stevens did not prevail. To claim that “prior to” just means on or
prior to was, perhaps, a bridge too far.
3. Future Challenges to Executive Action.—King is also likely a
harbinger of things to come. First, as suggested above, the enormousness
and complexity of both the modern administrative state and the
contemporary legislative process likely mean that contemporary statutes
will themselves continue to be enormous and complex.247 This, in turn,
means that unintentional legislative defects will continue to be available as
a basis for legal challenges to the programs those statutes create.
Second, Congress is increasingly unwilling or unable to address large
problems (e.g., climate change, immigration).248 For that reason, the trend
of addressing such problems through ambitious executive action is likely to
persist.249 And, hence, so too the trend of opponents of such action
241

471 U.S. 84 (1985).
Id. at 93 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
243 Id.
244 See id. at 120–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 123.
246 Id.; accord Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 467, 516–17 (2014).
247 See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
249 See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Takes Step to Cut Emissions from Planes,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/business/energy-environment/epasays-it-will-set-rules-for-airplane-emissions.html [http://perma.cc/KUK9-YB4V]; Michael D. Shear,
242
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searching for defects in the enormous and complex statutes upon which
such action relies.250
Consider, for example, the recent challenge to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposal concerning power plant emissions.251
After years of congressional inaction, President Obama, acting through the
EPA, has made numerous efforts to address climate change through
executive action. Of these, the most ambitious is the EPA’s “Clean Power
Plan,” which would regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants,
the largest concentrated source of such emissions in the United States.252 As
is, at this point, the standard response, opponents of this policy are seeking
to block it through legal challenge.253 The EPA proposed the Clean Power
Plan pursuant to Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).254 Without
going into the details, the problem is that, in 1990, Congress amended
Section 111(d) not once, but twice. Under the pre-1990 version of the
CAA, the EPA’s proposal would have been plainly permissible.255 In 1990,
however, the House and Senate proposed separate, inconsistent
amendments to Section 111(d) and, through some accident, both were
enacted into law.256 Under the language of the amendment that originated in

Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html
[http://perma.cc/VLE3X8YD]; Mark Landler & John M. Broder, Obama Outlines Ambitious Plan to Cut Greenhouse Gases,
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/politics/obama-plan-to-cutgreenhouse-gases.html [http://perma.cc/S47U-JZ5P].
250 See, e.g., Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (involving
challenge to Environmental Protection Agency ozone designations); Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d
733 (5th Cir. 2015) (involving challenge to a Department of Homeland Security program of deferred
action for undocumented immigrants who are the parents of citizens or lawful permanent residents).
251 See In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that courts do not have
authority to review proposed, as opposed to final, agency rules).
252 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
253 See In re Murray, 788 F.3d at 333–34.
254 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663.
255 The pre-1990 version of Section 111(d) obligated the EPA to require standards of performance
“for any existing source for any air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have not been issued or
which is not included on a list published under [S]ection [108(a)] or [112(b)(1)(A)].” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d)(1)(A) (1988). Under this version, the EPA was thus prohibited from regulating, under
Section 111(d), emissions of the same pollutant from the same source categories as are already
regulated under Section 112. The EPA regulated power plants for mercury emissions under Section 112
but not for greenhouse gas emissions. The Court invalidated the EPA’s regulation of mercury emissions
this Term. See Michigan v. EPA, No. 14-46 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (holding mercury regulation invalid
because the EPA failed to consider cost of regulation). For that reason, it is possible that the challenge
to the Clean Power Plan is now moot.
256 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 108(g), 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399,
2467, 2574 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012)).
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the Senate, the EPA’s proposal is, as before, plainly permissible.257 Under
the language that originated in the House, the proposal’s permissibility is
less clear.258 When the Office of Law Revision Counsel transcribed the
1990 amendments from the Statutes at Large into the United States Code, it
codified the language that originated in the House.259 Seizing in part on this
choice, opponents now argue that the Plan exceeds the EPA’s authority
under Section 111(d).260 Because the Senate language fits more neatly with
the rest of the Act as amended, the retention of the House language was
likely a scrivener’s error.261 Since, however, the House language is not
plainly incompatible with the Act as amended, that error is less than
“absolutely clear,” i.e., it is conceivable that the retention of the Senate
language was the error.
The challenge to the Clean Power Plan raises numerous questions that
go beyond the scope of this Article.262 For present purposes, what that
challenge illustrates is just that opponents can and, this Article predicts,
increasingly will identify and exploit drafting errors in the statutes upon
which ambitious executive actions rely to challenge those actions. Like
most such statutes, the CAA is enormous and complex. It is, for that
reason, unsurprising that it contains drafting errors. This makes it almost as
unsurprising that opponents of the Clean Power Plan were able to identify
and exploit one such error. And since there is nothing unique about this

257 The Senate amendment replaced the cross-reference to “section 112(b)(1)(A)” with a crossreference to “section 112(b).” § 302, 104 Stat. at 2574.
258 The House amendment replaced the cross-reference to “[S]ection 112(b)(1)(A)” with the phrase
“emitted from a source category which is regulated under [S]ection 112.” § 108(g), 104 Stat. at 2467.
Challengers argue that, under this amendment, EPA is thus prohibited from regulating under
Section 111(d) any emissions from a source category once that source category’s hazardous emissions
have been regulated under Section 112. Final Opening Brief of Petitioner at 15–28, In re Murray
Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-1112 and 14-1151), 2015 WL 1022477, at *15–
28.
259 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
260 See Final Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 258, at 34. But see Stephan v. United States,
319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943) (holding that “the Code cannot prevail over the Statutes at Large when the
two are inconsistent”); Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN
BAG 2D 283, 284 (2007) (“The Code is—no disrespect intended—a Frankenstein’s monster of [Statutes
at Large]. The Code is made by taking the [Statutes at Large], hacking them to pieces, rearranging
them, and stitching them back together in a way that gives them false life.”).
261 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/opinion/teaching-an-old-law-new-tricks.html
[http://perma.cc/
T3LU-Q6EC]; Kate Konschnik, EPA’s 111(d) Authority—Follow Homer and Avoid the Sirens, LEGAL
PLANET (May 28, 2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/05/28/guest-blogger-kate-konschnik-epas-111dauthority-follow-homer-and-avoid-the-sirens/ [http://perma.cc/2YQB-UGQ8].
262 E.g., whether to defer to an agency’s determination as to whether a statute contains a scrivener’s
error. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Mead As (Mostly) Moot: Predictive Interpretation in Administrative Law,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 499, 500 n.4 (2014) (considering whether the case for deference is weaker in
cases of ambiguity than in cases of vagueness).
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case—what agency-administered statute is not enormous and complex?—
one should anticipate similar challenges in the future.
CONCLUSION
Like all speakers, Congress misspeaks. Courts pretend otherwise far
too often. Under the current scrivener’s error doctrine, which permits
recognition only of errors that are “absolutely clear,” courts make
systematic interpretive mistakes. Litigants, meanwhile, are driven to
distorted argumentation, which, in turn, leads courts to create distorted law.
To remedy both problems, courts should recognize scrivener’s errors much
more freely. More specifically, courts should recognize such an error if and
only if an error is more likely than not. In so doing, courts would treat
Congress just like any other speaker. In this regard, that is just what
Congress is.
As a practical matter, correcting the scrivener’s error doctrine is
increasingly important. There is no end in sight to congressional inaction.
For that reason, ambitious executive action is likely the new normal. This
means continuing challenges to such actions in courts. And, as both King
and the challenge to the Clean Power Plan illustrate, such challenges will
often hinge on some drafting error in the underlying statute, which is
enormous and complex. The stakes in these challenges are high. The
scrivener’s error doctrine thus has to be right.
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